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ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE CANONICAL DISSENT
Anita S. Krishnakumar"
Legal theorists increasingly have come to recognize and study
the existence of a constitutional canon composed of highly authori-
tative legal texts that command special reverence in the law. Among
these highly authoritative texts are a series of dissenting opinions-
e.g., Justice Holmes's in Lochner v. New York, and Justice
Harlan's in Plessy v. Ferguson-that ironically are more famous
than the majority opinions in most other cases. This Article exam-
ines the evolution of the dissenting canon, seeking to explain both
the methods by which various dissenting opinions became canon-
ized and the motivating factors behind these canonizations.
Specifically, the Article argues that the canonization of dissent-
ing opinions began as a New Deal phenomenon-linked to the pub-
lic rejection of the Old Court's economic rights jurisprudence, as
embodied in the majority opinion in Lochner v. New York. The
canonization of Holmes's Lochner dissent, it is shown, was a prod-
uct both of progressive intellectuals eager to usher in the New Deal,
and of a judicial desire to memorialize the popular repudiation of
the Old Court's philosophy. Other early canonizations of dissent fol-
lowed the Lochner pattern, emerging only as responses to popular
rejections of old precedents. But as time wore on, the Court began
developing a new kind of canonization, whereby justices consciously
lifted and adopted principles articulated in dissenting opinions of
yore as authority for the formulation of new constitutional rights
and rules. Several civil liberties dissents (involving, inter alia, First
and Fourth Amendment rights) thus became canonized even before
the majority opinions which they criticized had been overruled.
The Article ends with a look at what the evolution of the dis-
senting canon teaches about the shape of the constitutional canon
as a whole-noting, for instance, the central role that political con-
flict plays in the creation and elevation of canonical texts.
Borrowing from a concept coined with reference to Biblical and
literary studies,' legal scholars recently have analogized a constitu-
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tional canon of highly authoritative uber-texts that hold a privileged
place in American law.2 Constitutive members of the canon include
revered judicial opinions such as Marbury v. Madison,3 textual pro-
visions such as the First Amendment, and founding documents such
as the Federalist Papers and the Declaration of Independence.
Some of these legal texts have been celebrated almost from their
inception; others have entered the canon only gradually, as consti-
tutional understandings have shifted and evolved. A few have
turned the canon on its head. Among these latter are a handful of
judicial dissents, originally penned to record the losing, minority
viewpoint-that since not only have shaken off the stigma of the
losing position but have come to command a constitutional stature
far superior to that accorded most majority opinions in other cases.
Justice Holmes's dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York,4 for
instance, rivals Brown v. Board of Education' in legal eminence and
distinction. Every law student in the country has read or at least
heard of Lochner, and Holmes's clairvoyance therein. Moreover,
judges,' scholars,7 and advocates alike regularly cite the dissent as
established legal doctrine.
1. See, e.g., HAROLD BLOOM, THE WESTERN CANON 4 (1994) (discussing Shake-
speare as "[olne mark of... originality that can win canonical status for a literary
work"); HENRY Louis GATES, JR., LOOSE CANONS: NOTES ON THE CULTURE WARS 22-
42 (1992) (discussing the early development of an African-American literary canon);
LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: CANONS, CULTURE,
AND HISTORY 91-101 (1996) (describing and discussing the American literary canon).
2. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 106 (1997); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Can-
ons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998).
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. Twenty-five Supreme Court opinions alone reference Holmes's Lochner dis-
sent as an important legal opinion. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2233 (1999); Glickman v. Wileman
Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 505 n.2 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Brown v.
Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 252 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); C & A Carbone,
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 425 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting); Ameri-
can Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 458 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring); TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 455 n.19 (1993); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 961-62 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes,
502 U.S. 251, 273 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Brown-
ing-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492'U.S. 257, 300 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 578
(1987); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 769 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 788 (1986) (White, J.,
dissenting); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 470 (1985) (Mar-
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In the hierarchical world of legal authority, the notion of dis-
senting opinions as thus influential is at once paradoxical and in-
triguing. It raises numerous questions such as how particular dis-
sents came to be renowned, why others were not, and what role the
canonization of dissents has played in the development of American
constitutional law. Yet the legal literature contains surprisingly
little on the phenomenon of canonical dissents or dissenters.8 This
Article undertakes to fill the void, exploring the genesis, evolution,
and significance of canonical dissents. I submit that, historically,
the canonization of dissents was a two-tiered process, which began
as part of the effort to cement the New Deal Court's switch in time,
and since has evolved into a judicial tool for the instigation of con-
stitutional change. Part I lays the groundwork for this bifurcated
theory of Canonization, analyzing the time and manner in which
individual dissents and dissenters became canonized. Part II as-
sesses a few existing theories of redeemed dissents, and concludes
that none can satisfactorily account for this constitutional develop-
ment. Part III elaborates on the bifurcated theory introduced in
Part I, filling in the gaps left by other theories.
I. THE HISTORY OF CANONIZATION
The practice of dissent in the Supreme Court dates back almost
to the Constitution's ratification,9 and judicial reversals of decisions
issued over dissent surfaced as early as the mid-1800s. ° Yet, no
shall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 900 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); E.E.O.C. v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 250 n.9 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); AFL-CIO v. Ameri-
can Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 723 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rummell v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1980); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973); Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S.
105, 109 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 523 (1965) (Black, J., dis-
senting); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 n.13 (1963); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 527 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
7. Some 669 law review articles similarly cite to Holmes's Lochner dissent.
Search of WESTLAW, JLR database (Aug. 15, 1999) (searching for "Lochner /p
Holmes /s Dissent!").
8. Indeed, as of February 6, 2000, only one essay discusses the existence of
canonical dissents and dissenters as such. See generally Richard A. Primus, Canon,
Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DuKE L.J. 243 (1998). Similarly, one piece
attempts to explain the canonization of dissenters. See G. Edward White, The Can-
onization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputations, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 576, 590 (1995).
9. See, e.g., Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 408 (1792) (Cushing, J.,
dissenting).
10. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406 (1856) (functionally
overruling Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842)).
20001
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol.52:781
dissents became canonized until the twentieth century." This part
explores the historical creation and expansion of the dissenting
canon, i.e., the subset of the constitutional canon composed of dis-
senting opinions, and argues that it is a New Deal phenomenon,
made possible by the Court's switch in time and attendant repudia-
tion of its prior economic rights jurisprudence. Part I.A. discusses
the Court's reluctance to reference dissents prior to the New Deal,
suggesting that this reflected the Court's pre-1937 image as infalli-
ble arbiter of constitutional law. Part I.B. explains how the switch
in time and its aftermath affected this image, and rendered accept-
able the citation of dissenting opinions as legal authority. Part I.C.
11. As suggested in the introduction, canonical dissents are those that are
viewed as constitutional icons, and that are accordingly cited and extolled as legal
authority in matters of constitutional interpretation. It follows that, in order for a
dissent to be canonized, it must both be famous and be the subject of frequent refer-
ence within the legal community. As fame is a difficult quality to measure, this Arti-
cle gauges the status of individual dissents by the number of favorable references
they have garnered in subsequent Supreme Court opinions-with ten references as a
baseline for canonical status. I selected the number ten because a study of Supreme
Court citations to dissenting opinions demonstrates a sharp drop-off around this
point. Indeed, while many canonical dissents are cited or quoted significantly more
than ten times, see infra Part I.C., few other dissents are referred to more than three
or four times. Compare, e.g., Search of WESTLAW, SCT database (Aug. 15, 1999)
(searching "Lochner & Holmes Is dissenting" and retrieving 26 cases, 23 of which
cite or quote Holmes's opinion in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)), and Search of WESTLAW, SCT database (Aug. 15, 1999)
(searching for "Olmstead & Brandeis /s dissenting" and finding 58 cases, 37 of which
cite or quote Brandeis's opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)), with Search of WESTLAW, SCT database and
SCT-OLD database (Aug. 15, 1999) (searching for "Dred /2 Scott Is dissenting" and
turning up two and zero cases respectively, citing to the Dred Scott dissents), and
Search of WESTLAW, SCT database (Aug. 15, 1999) (searching for "Taxicab &
Holmes /s dissenting" and locating eight cases, four of which cite or quote Holmes's
dissent in Black and White Taxicab v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab, 276 U.S. 518, 532
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
As Judge Richard Posner has noted:
The number of times a scientific or other scholarly work is cited in
the scholarly literature is an index to the influence, and less confi-
dently to the quality, of the paper. The counting of citations to the
work of a scholar is therefore a possible method of evaluating the
quality of the scholar's output, and of comparing the output of differ-
ent scholars. It is not only a possible method, but one that is heavily
used. There is no reason in principle why it could not be used as a
method of evaluating appellate judges.
Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Great-
ness, 104 YALE L.J. 511, 534 app. (book review) (1994). Nor, I submit, is there any
reason that counting subsequent citations should not be used as a method of
evaluating the stature of judicial opinions. In any case, I have used this slightly
imperfect empirical method mostly as a default, starting from a baseline of numer-
ous famous or vindicated dissents, and checking each for the frequency with which it
is later cited.
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explores the post-New Deal evolution of canonical dissents, and par-
ticularly, their role in the judicial expansion of civil rights.
A. Dissents That Could Have Been
Prior to the New Deal, the Supreme Court was extremely reluc-
tant to admit judicial error, let alone to overturn its earlier deci-
sions. Indeed, it feared that doing either would undermine its le-
gitimacy as final arbiter of the nation's law. The Court's unwilling-
ness to impugn its earlier judgments in turn left little room for the
vindication or subsequent canonization of its dissents. In fact, on
the few pre-New Deal occasions where the resurrection of dissent-
ing opinions might have been appropriate, the Court instead strug-
gled so assiduously to distinguish its prior caselaw-dissents and
all-that it eschewed association with dissenting opinions from the
past.
Take, for instance, the Court's treatment of Justice Field's dis-
sents in the Slaughter-House Cases" and Munn v. Illinois." In
Slaughter-House, Field railed against the majority's parsimonious
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause, arguing that the amendment protected economic liberties
such as the right to pursue a trade, and thus prohibited the state-
created monopoly upheld by the majority. 14 Similarly, Field's Munn
dissent denounced the Court's decision to uphold rate regulation on
the ground that such regulations violated private property rights.5
Although Lochner-era decisions in which the Court invalidated
statute after statute in the name of contractual liberty effectively
redeemed Field's economic rights position, Supreme Court opinions
of that era contain almost no mention of Field's dissents.1" Rather,
12. 83 U.S. (1 Wall.) 36 (1872).
13. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
14. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 83 (Field, J., dissenting).
15: See Munn, 94 U.S. at 140 (Field, J., dissenting).
16. Lower courts did cite to Field's dissents as authority in striking down laws
that interfered with the right of individuals to ply a trade. See, e.g., United States v.
Morris, 125 F.2d 322, 330-31 (E.D. Ark. 1903) (quoting Field's Slaughter-House
dissent in ruling that the rights to lease land and accept employment are fundamen-
tal rights which cannot be abridged); People ex rel. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 685
(N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting) (quoting Field's Munn dissent in arguing that
it is unconstitutional for legislatures to fix prices); White v. Holman, 74 P. 933, 935
(Or. 1904) (quoting Field's Slaughter-House dissent for the proposition that it is
unconstitutional for states to create business monopolies). However, the Supreme
Court itself rarely cited these dissents. Search of WESTLAW, SCT-OLD database
(Aug. 15, 1999) (searching for "Slaughter-House & Field/s dissenting" and retrieving
13 cases, only two of which cite or quote Field's Slaughter-House dissent as legal
authority); Search of WESTLAW, SCT-OLD database (Aug. 15, 1999) (searching for
"Munn & Field /s dissenting" and finding eight cases, one of which cites Field's dis-
sent in Munn as legal authority).
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in keeping with the Court's reluctance to admit prior judicial error,
Lochner-era opinions distinguish themselves from Slaughter-House
and Munn by relying on the due process liberty principle rather
than on the Privileges or Immunities or private property concepts
discarded in those two cases. To this day, the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause stands technically eviscerated, while most of the work it
was intended to do is accomplished via the Due Process Clause.
The Court's reversal of its decision in Hepburn v. Griswold,
17
also known as the Legal Tender Cases,"5 followed a similar pattern.
In that set of cases, decided shortly after the Civil War, the Su-
preme Court ruled unconstitutional the Legal Tender Act (a war-
time measure that had made paper currency into legal tender). Spe-
cifically, the Court found that the Act was "not a means appropri-
ate, plainly adapted, [or] really calculated to carry into effect any
express power vested in Congress."'9 Justice Miller dissented from
the decision, arguing that the Act clearly fell within Congress's
power to borrow money in the nation's name and was justified as a
necessary war-time measure."
Within one year, the Court reopened the issue and overruled
Hepburn, causing an outcry among the public.2' Concerned with the
effect this quick reversal would have on its institutional legitimacy,
the Court invented reasons why its earlier decision should be ig-
nored, declaring, for instance, that:
[Hepburn] was decided by a divided court, and by a court having a
less number of judges than the law then in existence provided this
court shall have. These cases have been heard before a full court,
and they have received our most careful consideration. The ques-
tions involved constitutional questions of the most vital impor-
17. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869).
18. The Legal Tender Cases consist of two decisions, Knox v. Lee and Parker v.
Davis. See 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
19. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 625.
20. Indeed, Miller's dissent expressly stated that:
The power to declare war, to suppress insurrection, to raise and sup-
port armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to borrow money on the
credit of the United States, to pay the debts of the Union, and to pro-
vide for the common defence and general warfare, are each and all dis-
tinctly and specifically granted in separate clauses of the Constitu-
tion.
We are in the midst of a war which called all these powers into ex-
ercise and taxed them severely.
Id. at 632 (Miller, J., dissenting).
21. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
519-25 (1926) (discussing public disapproval of the Court's decision to re-examine
the Legal Tender Cases and citing contemporary views expressed in periodicals that
the Court's decision to reopen the issues would weaken the Court's reputation in the
eyes of the public).
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tance to the government and to the public at large. We have been
in the habit of treating cases involving a consideration of constitu-
tional power differently from those which concern merely private
right. We are not accustomed to hear them in the absence of a full
court, if it can be avoided.2
Given its desire to disassociate itself from the Hepburn decision, the
Court's Knox opinion did not reference Miller's dissent, even though
it echoed his argument that Congress's express power to borrow
money encompassed the authority to issue legal tender.2 Moreover,
the Court's later decisions have failed to acknowledge Miller's Hep-
burn dissent, let alone to credit it as prophetic. While this may be
due in part to the speed with which Hepburn was overruled-so
that it never really became established law-it almost certainly had
something to do with the Court's embarrassed downplaying of the
entire episode.
Another, equally significant reason some pre-New Deal dissents
have failed to become canonized is because they were vindicated by
constitutional amendment rather than by subsequent Supreme
Court decisions. This, for instance, describes the fate of the dissents
in Dred Scott v. Sandford' and Pollock v. Farmer's Trust Co. 25 Dred
Scott famously held that free blacks never could become citizens. 6
Justice McLean dissented from the majority's ruling on the grounds
that slavery was immoral.27 Justice Curtis also dissented, arguing
that free blacks should be allowed to become citizens in light of the
fact that several states had permitted free blacks to vote on the
ratification of the Constitution itself.' Yet because the Civil War
and the Fourteenth Amendment-rather than a later Supreme
Court opinion-repudiated Dred Scott, and because they did so on a
scale far broader than either Justice Curtis or Justice McLean could
have imagined, modern courts apparently have found citation to the
dissents unnecessary and unsatisfactory.
Similarly, in Pollock, Justice Harlan dissented from the Court's
decision that taxes on income from real and personal property were
unconstitutional. 9 Yet despite the fact that history has rendered his
view correct, Harlan's dissent has failed to achieve canonical
22. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 553-54 (citation omitted).
23. See id. at 464.
24. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
25. 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
26. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 406.
27. See id. at 538 (McLean, J., dissenting) ("All slavery has its origins in power,
and is against right.").
28. See id. at 577 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
29. See Pollock, 158 U.S. at 638 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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status.3 Since Pollock was overruled by the Sixteenth Amendment
(which explicitly authorizes the taxation of income)" rather than by
a subsequent Supreme Court decision, the legal community has had
little reason to embrace Harlan's position that the original Consti-
tution itself permitted income taxation; it is enough that the Consti-
tution in its current form does so. Thus, the Sixteenth Amendment
has overshadowed the Pollock dissent much as the Fourteenth has
overshadowed the Dred Scott dissents.
B. The Birth of the Dissenting Canon
The New Deal, however, forever changed the landscape against
which dissenting opinions operated. As with the Hepburn-Knox and
Slaughter-House-Lochner turnabouts, the New Deal Court's "switch
in time" effected substantial constitutional change absent any for-
mal amendment. 2 This time, however, the change was preceded by
a pronounced public and political rejection of the Old Court's eco-
nomic rights jurisprudence that forced the recognition of past judi-
cial error, and paved the way for the exaltation of those who had
seen it coming.
1. Lochner v. New York
The first Supreme Court dissent to become canonized was Jus-
tice Holmes's opinion in Lochner v. New York.33 The majority opin-
ion in Lochner struck down maximum hours legislation for bakers;
Holmes had used the occasion to rail against judicial interference
with legislative enactments on behalf of what he perceived as
judges' personal economic predilections. Specifically, Holmes argued
that:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of
the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I
agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and
long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be
my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or dis-
agreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody
30. Search of WESTLAW, SCT database (Aug. 15, 1999) (searching for "Pollock
/p Harlan Is dissenting" and retrieving one case that cites Justice Harlan's Pollock
dissent).
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have the power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.").
32. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 312-33 (1998)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS].
33. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes J., dissenting). Holmes's Lochner dissent has
been cited or quoted in 25 subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See cases cited
supra note 6.
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their opinions in law .... The Fourteenth Amendment does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics .... [a] constitution is
not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or
of laissez faire.34
In the aftermath of the switch in time, the Lochner decision was
demonized as a symbol of the Old Court's flawed economic rights
jurisprudence, and Holmes's criticisms of the Old Court's philoso-
phy became hailed as prescient legal wisdom. Yet the lionization of
Holmes's dissent did not coincide with the switch in time or even
with the demonization of the Lochner majority opinion. Although
the Lochner doctrine was discredited in 1937, 3 and constructively
overturned in 1938,36 the first judicial citations to Holmes's opinion
did not surface until the late 1940s.37 By that time, the repudiation
(both popular and judicial) of economic due process rights had been
completed, and the dissenting position of Justice Holmes in the
Lochner line of cases' had been thoroughly vindicated. This lag be-
tween repudiation and elevation is significant because it indicates
that the canonization of the Lochner dissent arose as an ex-post
reaction to the New Deal Court's reversal of a hated constitutional
precedent, not as an auxiliary to that event.
Indeed, later Courts cite the Lochner dissent not as a justifica-
tion for overturning the Old Court's established line of precedent,
but in recognition of its ultimate vindication 39 and as an admonition
34. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
35. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (construing
broadly Congress's Commerce Clause Powers in upholding the National Labor Rela-
tions Act); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling the
Lochner-era case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and uphold-
ing minimum wage laws against Due Process Clause attacks).
36. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (introduc-
ing the rational basis test of judicial deference to legislative decisions).
37. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 527 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Holmes's admonition that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics"); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 147
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Holmes's caution that "[g]eneral proposi-
tions do not decide concrete cases").
38. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 554-62 (1923) (striking
down minimum wage legislation for women); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26
(1915) (invalidating a statute which forbade employers from prohibiting employee
membership in labor organizations); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 179-80
(1908) (striking down a statute that prohibited employers from discharging employ-
ees based on labor organization membership).
39. The Court's first two citations to the dissent acknowledge the validity of
Holmes's admonitions. See Winters, 333 U.S. at 527; Harris, 331 U.S. at 157. Subse-
quent citations, however, tend to quote the dissent as a warning against Lochner-
style mistakes. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) ("As
2000]
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against repeating the egregious mistakes of the Lochner era. Watch
out, we must be careful not to read our own biases into the Constitu-
tion, they warn, lest we let "the ghost of Lochner v. New York walk
again.""0 In this vein, the two most quoted propositions from
Holmes's dissent are his exhortation that "the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,""' and its
corollary, "a constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory,"4 both of which are referenced as authority for the
proposition that judges should not measure the constitutionality of
legislation based on their own agreement or disagreement with its
substance. Thus, the canonization of the Lochner dissent was a ju-
dicial reaction to the country's lived experience under the Lochner
doctrine. Once the Great Depression and its aftermath had demon-
strated the vicissitudes of Lochner-style jurisprudence, the Court
both rejected that jurisprudence and began to echo the cautions of
its greatest detractor in an effort to guard against analogous mis-
takes in the future.
2. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann
The New Deal Court's rejection of the Lochner-era economic
rights jurisprudence also played a critical role in the canonization of
the history of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only
limits to such judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen at
the time to be Members of this Court."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[A liberal reading of the Due Process Clause] is no
less dangerous when used to enforce this Court's views about personal rights than
those about economic rights."); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("For years the [Lochner] court struck down social legislation when a
particular law did not fit the notions of a majority of Justices as to legislation appm-
priate for a free enterprise system. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, rightly [cau-
tioned against this].").
40. Federal Hous. Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 92 (1958) (citation
omitted).
41. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Of the 25 cases that cite the
Lochner dissent, eight quote this sentence. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S.Ct. 2219, 2233 (1999); Glickman v. Wile-
man Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 505 n.2 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); C&A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 425 (1994) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 300 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 723 (1980) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 n.13 (1963); Winters,
333 U.S. at 527 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
42. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75. Of the remaining 17 cases that cite the Lochner
dissent, four quote this sentence. See C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 425 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 961 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); City of Cleburne v. Cle-
burne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 470 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S.
869, 900 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brandeis's dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann.4 In
Liebmann, the Court held that an Oklahoma requirement that ice
manufacturers obtain a certificate from the state before they could
construct an ice plant violated manufacturers' due process liberty
interest in "engaging in a lawful, private business."" Brandeis's
dissent protested that the majority's decision would impede states'
ability to respond to the nation's changing needs:
Some people assert that our present plight is due, in part, to the
limitations set by courts upon experimentation in the fields of so-
cial and economic science ....
... Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with se-
rious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citi-
zens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
As with the Lochner dissent, the first citation to the Liebmann
dissent did not appear until 1947.46 By that time, the nation's ex-
perience with the Great Depression and the New Deal reforms had
proven the value of a broad legislative power of experimentation.
Moreover, the due process liberty concept on which the Liebmann
majority relied had been thoroughly repudiated. 4 Thus the lioniza-
tion of the Liebmann dissent, like that of the Lochner dissent before
it, occurred as a derivative rather than a component of the abroga-
tion of the Old Court's economic rights jurisprudence.
Further, the modern Court's citations to the Liebmann dissent,
like its citations to the Lochner dissent, have been cast primarily as
warnings not to repeat the Old Court's mistakes. 9 Indeed, the Court
typically quotes the dissent's "laboratory of experiments" concept as
an admonition against the curtailment of states' regulatory powers,
lest it impede the nation's progress. In Reeves v. Stake for instance,
the Court, quoting from the Liebmann dissent, upheld South Da-
43. 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The dissent has been
cited or quoted 27 times by subsequent courts. Search of WESTLAW, SCT database
(Aug. 15, 1999) (searching for Liebmann & Brandeis /s dissenting" and retrieving 27
cases that cite or quote Brandeis's Liebmann dissent as legal authority).
44. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 277-78.
45. Id. at 310-11 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
46. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 296 (1947), overruled in part by, Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
47. See AcKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 32, at 257 (noting a judicial
shift by the end of the New Deal era towards acceptance of legislative efforts to
regulate business enterprises).
48. See id. (noting the repudiation of "laissez-faire jurisprudence").
49. See id. at 255-56 (noting the "New Deal generation['s]" warnings against
repeating the mistakes of the Old Court).
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kota's "residents only" policy for the purchase of state-owned ce-
ment for fear that striking down the policy would "threaten the fu-
ture fashioning of effective and creative programs for solving local
problems and distributing government largesse." ° Accordingly, the
Liebmann dissent, like its Lochner precursor, appears to have been
canonized as a judicial memorialization of the nation's adverse ex-
perience with the Old Court's restrictions on legislative power.
3. Canonical Dissenters
The New Deal also made possible the canonization of the au-
thors of the Lochner and Liebmann dissents-Justices Holmes and
Brandeis. Notably, both Holmes and Brandeis received considerable
praise from progressive intellectuals long before the switch in time
vindicated their dissenting philosophies. Yet as the following dis-
cussion shows, it is unlikely that this contemporary praise would
have blossomed into the historical reverence the Justices enjoy to-
day absent the switch in time.
a. Oliver Wendell Holmes
Then professor Felix Frankfurter was the first to praise Holmes,
with a eulogistic essay in the Harvard Law Review entitled The
Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes.5' It took some time for
others to follow suit, but during the late 1920s and early 1930s, a
series of articles appeared in the New Republic and other progres-
sive New Deal magazines hailing Holmes as the "idol" of the pro-
gressive movement and casting him as "the great dissenter."5 The
authors of these articles were members of the liberal elite who
sought to promote the New Deal and embraced Holmes's methodol-
ogy as a means of reversing the Old Court's jurisprudence and ush-
ering in President Roosevelt's reforms.5 It was this conscious desire
to elevate Holmes that led Frankfurter to compare Holmes's reason-
ing to John Marshall's in one of his eulogistic Harvard Law Review
50. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980).
51. Felix Frankfurter, The Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes, 29 HARV.
L. REV. 683, 684 (1916) (noting Justice Holmes's tremendous influence over the
development of constitutional law).
52. See, e.g., Charles E. Carpenter, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jurist, 8 OR. L. REV.
269, 270 (1929) (noting that "Justice Holmes has been a great dissenter ... perhaps
due to the fact that he has been a great liberal"); John Dewey, Justice Holmes and
the Liberal Mind, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 11, 1928, at 210, 211 (stating that '[h]is ideas
have usually been at least a generation ahead of the day in which they were uttered;
many of his most impressive statements have been set forth in dissenting opinions");
Oswald G. Villard, Issues and Men, The Great Judge, 140 NATION 323, 323 (1935)
(praising Holmes as "the idol of progressives who believed that America must evolve
and change").
53. See White, supra note 8, at 590.
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essays about the Justice -for such comparison lent legitimacy to
the progressives' project to convince the nation and the Court of the
New Deal's consonance with the Constitution. Similarly, others
praised Holmes's "faith that ... our social system is one of experi-
mentation subject to the ordeal of experienced consequences,"" and
commented that "no judge who has sat upon the bench has ever
been more progressive in his attitude."56
Thus, in marked contrast to the canonization of his Lochner dis-
sent, the elevation of Justice Holmes himself was more than a mere
reaction to the repudiation of the Old Court's Lochner-era economic
due process jurisprudence. Rather, Holmes's canonization was part
and parcel of the project to reconstitute the Court's interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Once the switch in time had effected
this reconstitution, and permitted the New Deal to become a perva-
sive element in American society, commentators began to hail
Holmes, not just as their champion of right, but as a "prophet" and
a cultural hero. Writing in the 1940s, for instance, Zechariah
Chafee of the American Historical Review lauded Holmes for
"guid[ing] the nation with the insight of a philosopher through a
host of problems which were wholly unforeseen when he was
young.""7 Charles Clark, then Dean of the Yale Law School, simi-
larly eulogized that
if... many of our brilliant young men ... still cherish a belief in
idealism as a proper motivating force for a public career and law as
an assisting means, then we owe, indeed, a large measure of grati-
tude to that wise, witty, and eloquent aristocrat who dared to de-
sert his class to express these thoughts.6
By the late 1950s, even Hollywood and Broadway had joined in the
praise of Justice Holmes, making him the subject of a popular
movie 9 and a play.6" While Justice Holmes's elevation began well
before the switch in time or the implementation of the New Deal, it
was the success of the New Deal movement that guaranteed the
public nature and longevity of his revered stature.
54. See Frankfurter, supra note 51, at 684-85.
55. Dewey, supra note 52, at 210-11.
56. Carpenter, supra note 52, at 270.
57. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 49 AM. HIST. REv. 457, 459 (1943).
58. Charles E. Clark, Mr. Justice Holmes, NEW REPUBLIC, June 28, 1943, at 868-
869 (book review).
59. See THE MAGNIFICENT YANKEE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1950).
60. See Emmet Lavery, The Magnificent Yankee (1946).
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b. Louis Dembitz Brandeis
Justice Brandeis's canonization, like Justice Holmes's, was in-
extricably linked to the promotion and success of the New Deal. As
in the case of Holmes, progressive praise for Brandeis began
slightly before the vindication of the Justice's dissents in 1937. In
1931, the New York Times began publishing a series of articles
praising Brandeis's "logic, his learning, the lucid order of his rea-
soning, the exactness of his language, his extraordinary penetration
of facts"61 and declaring him "one destined to be memorable in the
front row of great judges."" Others soon joined in the praise, hailing
Brandeis as 'an analyst of the processes of his own times '"' and
praising his concern with the social, economic, and political ramifi-
cations of proposed legislation. .' Brandeis's Liebmann dissent,
though silent on the wisdom of federal economic regulation,65 soon
became the rallying cry for intellectuals determined to usher in the
New Deal's redistributive reforms. Hence, the New York Times' ci-
tations to the Liebmann dissent as evidence for the proposition that
Brandeis was "[a] vigorous defender of many New Deal measures
and social experimentation."6
As the switch in time and the Court's subsequent rulings vindi-
cated the New Deal and Brandeis's dissenting position, the Justice's
status flourished. Brandeis quickly became a judicial hero, lauded
as a "prophet"67 and "the spiritual father of the New Deal."' Indeed,
61. Mr. Justice Brandeis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1941, § 3, at 1.
62. Id.; accord R.L. Duffus, Brandeis, Crusader at Eighty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1936, § 8 (Magazine), at 4; Justice Stone Ill, Kept from Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1936, § 1, at 3 [hereinater Justice Stone Ill] (quoting and exalting Brandeis's Lieb-
mann dissent).
63. White, supra note 8, at 604 (quoting A.A. Berle, Jr., The Way of an American,
SURv. GRAPHIC, Nov. 1936, at 597, 597).
64. See id. at 603 (describing Brandeis "as a judge who believed in the capacity
of humans to alter purportedly inexorable external forces in a nation's history").
65. Indeed, as Professor Edward G. White points out in his pioneer article, The
Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputations,
Brandeis's Liebmann dissent hardly indicates support for the New Deal. See White,
supra note 8. In fact, while Brandeis may have subscribed to the view that laissez
faire capitalism was a large contributor to the economic disorder of the 1930s, he did
not think that regulation by the federal government of the economy was the Solution
to this ill. See id. In Professor White's words, "[however 'prophetic' [Brandeis] may
have been about economic difficulties, he was by no means prophetic about the poli-
cies initiated by the Roosevelt administration. . . ." Id. at 602.
66. Justice Stone Ill, supra note 62, § 1, at 3.
67. See Supreme Court Honors Brandeis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1941, at 24 (quoting
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's remarks from the bench on Oct. 6, 1941, reported at
314 U.S. vii, viii (1941)).
68. Warren H. Pierce, Shaper of Economic Thought, CHI. DAILY TIMES, Oct. 7,
1941, reprinted in MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: GREAT AMERICAN 58 (Irving Dilliard ed.,
1941) [hereinafter GREAT AMERICAN].
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it was at this point that he acquired the appellation "Isaiah," 9 and
was credited with the ability to see "the directions of our social pro-
gress."" Moreover, commentators routinely suggested that "much of
what [was] best in the New Deal trace[d] directly to [Brandeis's]
influence."7' Thus Brandeis's canonization, like Holmes's, began as
part of the movement to undo the Old Court's jaded jurisprudence,
and ultimately was cemented by that movement's success.
C. The Dissenting Canon Expands
Once the New Deal had set a precedent for the canonization of
dissenting opinions and turned Justices Holmes and Brandeis into
judicial heroes, the Court began to elevate other dissents written by
these justices and, eventually, to canonize dissenting opinions
penned by other justices as well. These other canonizations some-
times followed the memorialization-warning pattern7' set by the
Lochner and Liebmann dissents. More often, however, they did not.
Indeed, after Lochner and Liebmann, the canonization of dissenting
opinions sometimes preceded or coincided with the vindication of
the dissent's substantive position. This Part examines such later
canonizations and seeks to identify salient patterns in their evolu-
tion.
1. The Free Speech Cases: Abrams, Whitney, and Gitlow
Although its origins lay in the aftermath of the New Deal, the
elevation of the Holmes-Brandeis free speech dissents 73 deviated
69. See Harvey J. Bresler, Brandeis, Epitome of Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
22, 1946, § 7, at 4 (book review) ("It was with wisdom that Franklin D. Roosevelt
addressed [Brandeis], affectionately, as 'Isaiah.'").
70. Joseph N. Moody, COMMONWEAL, Book Review, Sept. 27, 1946, at 580, 581.
71. Edward A. Evans, Believed in Realities, Not Formulas, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS (Denver), Oct. 6, 1941, reprinted in GREAT AMERICAN, supra note 68, at 84,
cited in White, supra note 8, at 606.
72. For a fuller explication of the various methods by which a dissent may be-
come canonized, see infra Part III.A.
73. Justice Brandeis's opinion (joined by Holmes) in Whitney v. California tech-
nically was a concurrence; however, it is often considered a dissent because Holmes
and Brandeis disagreed with the majority on substantive grounds, concurring in
their judgment only because of a procedural issue (e.g., the defendant had failed to
raise the clear-and-present danger defense, on which Holmes and Brandeis based
their finding that his actions were lawful, at the trial level). See 274 U.S. 357, 372
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled in part by, Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969). The Whitney concurrence has been cited 51 times. Search of
WESTLAW, SCT database (Apr. 21, 2000) (searching for "Whitney & Brandeis /s
concurring" and finding 55 cases, of which 51 cite or quote Brandeis's Whitney con-
currence in an authoritative capacity). The dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), has been cited 26 times. Search of
WESTLAW, SCT database, (Apr. 21, 2000) (searching for "Abrams /s Holmes /s dis-
senting" and finding 27 cases, of which 26 cite or quote Holmes's dissent as author-
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substantially from the pattern set by the Lochner and Liebmann
dissents. Notably, the apotheosis of the free speech dissents did not
ensue from a categorical repudiation of the original decisions in
those cases. Rather, the first few references to the dissents surfaced
in the 1940s,74 several years before the Court decisively had aban-
doned the speech restrictive jurisprudence against which the dis-
sents protested. These early citations almost exclusively referenced
the dissents for their reiteration of the "clear and present danger"
test articulated in the Court's majority opinion in Schenck v. United
States.75 In fact, not only did the Court's initial citations to the dis-
sents often reference Schenck in the same breath, 7 but the Court
77continued to uphold speech restrictive city ordinances, labor or-
ganization provisions mandating disassociation with the Commu-
nist Party and disavowal of any belief in the violent overthrow of
the government, 7 and statutes criminalizing association with the
Communist Party79 even as it referenced these dissents.8 Citations
ity). The dissent in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting), is cited or quoted twelve times. Search of WESTLAW, SCT database (Aug.
15, 1999) (searching for "Holmes /s Gitlow Is dissenting" and finding 15 cases that
cite or quote the Gitlow dissent as authority). It should be noted that there is signifi-
cant overlap between the citation of these dissents-i.e., most of the cases that cite
the Abrams dissent also cite the Whitney concurrence and/or the Gitlow dissent.
74. See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 396 n.11
(1950) (citing Abrams's dissent while upholding a provision of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act that required its officers to file affidavits disclaiming member-
ship in the Communist Party and any belief in overthrow of the government by
force); Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 102 n.8 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting
Brandeis's Whitney concurrence in a case affirming a defendant's conviction for
advocating polygamy).
75. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (introducing the clear and present danger test but uphold-
ing an Espionage Act conviction for conspiracy to distribute antidraft literature).
76. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 26 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 n.2 (1942) (citing Schenk and
Brandeis's Whitney concurrence in support of the proposition that "the right of free
speech is not absolute in all circumstances"); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261
(1941) (citing both Schenk and Brandeis's Whitney concurrence to recognize the
complexities in determining "proximity and degree" in the "clear and present danger
test"); Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 313 (1941)
(Black, J., dissenting).
77. See, e.g., Musser, 333 U.S. at 98 (vacating public morals statute for interpre-
tation by the Utah Supreme Court).
78. See, e.g., Douds, 339 U.S. at 395-96 (citing Brandeis but rejecting the "clear
and present danger" test as applicable to the case).
79. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1
(1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (citing Schenk but finding
the statute only prohibits violent aims); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503-
06, 508-09 (1950) (citing to and discussing Schenck but upholding the validity of a
statute criminalizing conspiracy to advocate overthrow of the government).
796 [Vol.52:781
EVOLUTION OF THE CANONICAL DISSENT
to the free speech dissents continued essentially in this vein until
the early 1960s, when the Court began to embrace the "marketplace
of ideas" and "public discussion" concepts with which the dissents
typically are associated today.8
Thus, by the time the Court finally renounced the free speech
doctrine followed in Abrams, Whitney, and Gitlow in 1969,82 it was
not responding to an antecedent vilification of the holdings in those
cases. Rather, it was cementing a shift in First Amendment juris-
prudence that had begun several years earlier. Accordingly, the free
speech dissents are cited not as warnings against repeating the
mistakes of the past, but as models of construction for interpreting
the extent of protection afforded by the First Amendment. Holmes's
dissent in Abrams, for instance, is cited for its principle that "the
best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market," not as a reminder of the Espionage Act
and its consequences. Similarly, the Whitney concurrence is quoted
for its eloquent articulation of the value of public discussion and its
exhortation that "the remedy to be applied [for subversive or unde-
sirable speech] is more speech, not enforced silence,"' for its rejec-
tion of California's criminal syndicalism statute. Likewise, the Git-
low dissent is referenced for its position that ideas should be "given
their chance" to win or lose in popular discourse, not as a caution
against the dangers of criminal anarchy laws. Thus the canoniza-
tion of the free speech dissents, unlike that of the Lochner and
Liebmann dissents, appears to have been part and parcel-rather
than a reaction to-the evolution of the Court's free speech juris-
prudence.
80. See, e.g., Douds, 339 U.S. at 395 n.10 (quoting Brandeis's concurring opinion
in Whitney but distinguishing it in upholding restrictions on the actions of persons
affiliated with the Communist Party).
81. The Court made several references to the Whitney concurrence/dissent's
"public discussion" concept in the 1940s. See Musser, 333 U.S. at 102 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 157-58 (1943). Nonethe-
less, the bulk of the Court's references to this principle did not appear until the
1960s. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1969); Curtis Publ'g Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 148 n.12 (1967); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 344 (Black, J.,
dissenting); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964); Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 576 n.12 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 62-63 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Wilkinson
v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 423 n.11 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
82. Although only Whitney has been expressly overruled, see Brandenburg, 395
U.S. at 444, the categorical affirmation of the Holmes-Brandeis free speech model in
that case effectively overturned the rulings in the other free speech cases as well.
83. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
84. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 385 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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2. Olmstead v. United States
The elevation of Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead followed
a pattern only slightly different from that forged by the free speech
dissents. As with the free speech cases, the Court began citing to
the Olmstead dissent in 1945,88 long before the Olmstead decision
was overruled.8 These early citations primarily referenced Justice
Brandeis's broad elaboration of the "right to be let alone":87
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions fa-
vorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.88
Less often, they focused on the related principle of the right to pri-
vacy 9 or quoted Brandeis's admonition that the government
85. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 423 n.7 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dis-
senting in part). In all, the dissent was cited or quoted eleven times between 1945
and 1967. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-80 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 585 n.44 (1965) (Warren, J., concurring); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494 (Gold-
berg, J., concurring); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454 n.3 (1963) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Gibson, 372 U.S. at 568 n.7 (Douglas, J., concurring); Poe, 367 U.S. at
550 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); Irvine v. Cali-
fornia, 347 U.S. 128, 146 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United States v. Mor-
ton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 651 (1950); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186, 203 n.30 (1946); Malinski, 324 U.S. at 423 n.7 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part).
86. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (expressly overruling
Olmstead). The Court's specific holding in Olmstead technically was overturned by
Congress via the Communications Act of 1934 (which prohibited the electronic inter-
ception of telephone communications, see DONALD E. LIVELY, FORESHADOWS OF THE
LAW: SUPREME COURT DISSENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 145 (1992)),
but constitutional case law with respect to the Fourth Amendment continued to turn
on Olmstead standards of a physical intrusion into a protected place until the
Court's decision in Katz.
87. The right to be let alone was first articulated in a law review article coau-
thored by Justice Brandeis several years earlier. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). However, it was
Brandeis's Olmstead dissent which enshrouded it with the legal authority it enjoys
today.
88. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
89. In Harris, Morton Salt, Poe, and Griswold, members of the Court expressly
cited to 'the right to be let alone." See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring); Poe, 367 U.S. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at
651; Harris, 331 U.S. at 159 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In Irvine, however, the
Court discussed police actions that "drastically invade privacy." Irvine, 347 U.S. at
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"teaches the whole people by its example" as a justification for im-
posing restraints on government officials.'
Significantly, the character of the Court's citations to the
Olmstead dissent has remained substantially the same since the
case was overruled in 1967, though the incidence of citations to the
dissent has increased. 9' Indeed, the dissent typically is cited not for
the narrow proposition that Fourth Amendment protection should
extend to private conversations, or to warn against the dangers of
wiretaps, but to support a broad reading of the protections afforded
by the Fourth Amendment. 9 This is true despite the fact that the
Katz decision explicitly rejected an expansive interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment that would "translate[] into a general constitu-
tional 'right of privacy."'9' Thus, as with the free speech cases, the
rejection of Olmstead's specific holding (that electronic eavesdrop-
ping on telephone conversations did not violate the Fourth Amend-
discussed police actions that "drastically invade privacy." Irvine, 347 U.S. at 146
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479-80.
90. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479-80.
91. The Court has cited the Olmstead dissent 41 times since Katz, compared
with 11 citations before then. Of the post-Katz citations, 16 reference the right to be
let alone. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 459 (1990); Wash-
ington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 238 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring); FW/PBS, Inc. v.
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 641 (1989); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 361 (1985); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring);
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 435 (1981); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 44-
45 n.2 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 253 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65 (1974);
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 15 (1974); Miesel v. United States, 412
U.S. 954, 954 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972); Stanley, 394 U.S.
at 564. Ten opinions analogize a related right to privacy. See United States Dep't of
Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 501 (1994); Bowers, 478
U.S. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 619 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280 (1983); Kelley, 425 U.S.
at 250 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Boraas, 416 U.S. at 15; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 85 n.9 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,
188 (1971); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 453 (1971). Ten opinions reference the
dangers inherent in a government that does not obey its own laws. See Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997); Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
330 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 687 (1989); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 312 n.3 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S.
305, 367 (1985); Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 352 n.2 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532 & n.15 (1980); Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 593 (1980); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.
727, 733-34 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 483 (1976).
92. See sources cited supra note 91.
93. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
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ment) in Katz has proven far less salient to the canonization of its
dissent than have the broad rules of Fourth Amendment construc-
tion advanced therein.
3.. Plessy v. Ferguson
In elevating Justice John Marshall Harlan's Plessy v. Ferguson94
dissent, the Court harkened back to the pattern set by its Lochner
and Liebmann canonizations. As with the Lochner and Liebmann
opinions, Harlan's Plessy dissent chastised the Court and warned of
the dangers inherent in its line of reasoning:
[Iun view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citi-
zens are equal before the law .... In my opinion, the judgment this
day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the
5decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case.
It took nearly fifty years for Harlan's words to be vindicated,96 as
the Court, in the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, functionally overruled the "separate but equal" doctrine set
forth in Plessy.
Yet the Court's opinion in Brown made no mention of the Plessy
dissent; instead the Court explicitly distinguished Plessy on the
ground that times and circumstances had changed. In fact, the first
judicial citation to the Plessy dissent did not appear until 1961, 9'
and frequent quotation of the dissent did not commence until the
late 1980s.9 " By 1961, the civil rights movement was well underway,
and the Court's disapprobation of the separate but equal doctrine
well-established; by the 1980s, both society's and the Court's dis-
avowal of the Plessy decision itself had become firmly entrenched.
Thus, as with the Lochner dissent, the lionization of the Plessy dis-
94. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Harlan's dissent in Plessy has been cited or quoted 16
times in 10 subsequent cases. Search of WESTLAW, SCT database (Aug. 15, 1999)
(searching "Plessy & Harlan Is dissenting" and retrieving 16 references, 12 of which
cite or quote the Plessy dissent as authority).
95. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
96. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (holding that "[t]o sepa-
rate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority .... [and] [a]ny language in Plessy v.
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.") (emphasis added).
97. See Garner, 368 U.S. at 177 (referencing Mr. Justice Harlan's reasoning in
"the landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson").
98. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (quoting the Plessy dis-
sent's caution that "[t]he destinies of the two races in this country are indissolubly
linked together").
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sent occurred as a memorial, rather than a source, for the demoni-
zation of the Plessy decision and the racist doctrine it propounded.
Also analogous to the Lochner case is the manner in which the
Court has cited to the Plessy dissent. During the 1960s, the Court
referenced and admired the wisdom of Harlan's dissent," whereas
in the 1980s it cited the dissent almost exclusively as a warning not
to repeat the mistakes of the past. Indeed, the Court often has
quoted the dissent's declaration that "Our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens," as a
somber reminder of how dangerous and hateful discriminatory dis-
tinctions can be in cases involving modern racial preferences.' 0
Thus the Plessy dissent, like that in Lochner, owes its canonization
to its symbolic power as the voice of caution against a doctrine that
later experience has proved to be anathema.
4. John Marshall Harlan the Elder
The elevation of the Plessy dissent also gave rise to the apotheo-
sis of another canonical dissenter, Justice John Marshall Harlan
the Elder. Although Harlan had been disliked for most of his tenure
on the Court,' the events of the 1960s transformed him into a judi-
cial saint. Scholars and biographers composed volumes eulogizing
his dissents, 2 and the legal community began to include him in its
lists of "great" Supreme Court Justices.0' The impetus behind this
canonization appears to have been the vindication of Harlan's dis-
sents in the Civil Rights Cases" and Plessy,'° occasioned by the
99. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 363, 378 n.7 (1966)
(Black, J., dissenting); Garner, 368 U.S. at 176.
100. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 650-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting); City
of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
101. Justice Holmes, for instance, called him a man of weak abilities, see Henry S.
Cohn, Book Review, 69 CONN. B.J. 443, 443 (1995), and once remarked that Harlan
"did not shine either in analysis or generalization." John Phillip Reid, Commentary:
Beneath the Titans, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 653, 663 & n.54 (1995) (citing Letter from
Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 5, 1919), reprinted in 2 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS 7, 7-8 (Mark D. Howe ed., 2d ed. 1961)).
102. See, e.g., ALAN BARTH, PROPHETS WITH HONOR: GREAT DISSENT AND GREAT
DISSENTERS IN THE SUPREME COURT 27-30 (1974) (characterizing Harlan's Plessy
dissent as prophetic); FRANK LATHAM, THE GREAT DISSENTER: JOHN MARSHALL
HARLAN 1833-1911 at viii (1970) (discussing Harlan's dissents as "miles ahead of
[Justice] Holmes"); Alan F. Westin, Mr. Justice Harlan, in MR. JUSTICE 93-126 (Alli-
son Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds., rev. ed. 1964) (discussing Justice Harlan's
life). See generally G. Edward White, John Marshall I: The Precursor, 19 AM. J.
LEG. HIST 1 (1975) (discussing Justice Harlan's jurisprudence and the augmentation
of his reputation).
103. GREAT JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: RATINGS & CASE STUDIES 25-
28 app. A (William D. Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds., 1993).
104. 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Civil Rights Act and subsequent Supreme Court decisions uphold-
ing them. 6 For as the nation came to recognize and reject the moral
iniquity of the separate but equal doctrine, Harlan and his dissent-
ing voice became the noble and judicious symbol of how the law
should have been.
The canonization of the first Justice Harlan differed from that
of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in that it occurred posthumously,
more than fifty years after the Justice's death-and nearly seventy
years after he penned what would ultimately become his most fa-
mous dissent. ' 7 Moreover, it was unique in that it appears to have
occurred as a reaction, rather than an ancillary, to the Court's re-
pudiation of the separate but equal doctrine and its concomitant
vindication of Harlan's Plessy dissent. Yet whatever the differences
in their origins, the apotheoses of all three Justices owe their lon-
gevity to the categorical repudiation of the constitutional doctrines
against which the Justices were the first to agitate.
5. Poe v. Ullman
The lionization of the second Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v.
Ullman... presents an interesting wrinkle in the historical develop-
ment of the dissenting canon. As with the free speech cases and
Olmstead, the majority opinion in Poe, though considered a mis-
take, is hardly reviled by modern courts. More significantly, the Poe
dissent was vindicated a mere four years after it was written, in a
case that is itself famous today-Griswold v. Connecticut."9 Fur-
ther, the Griswold case involved the exact same statute and almost
the same set of facts as those present in Poe; thus the question
arises as to why later courts would cite the Poe dissent at all, rather
than rely exclusively on the majority opinion in Griswold.
The answer appears to lie in the subtly different rationales ad-
vanced by the two decisions for invalidating the contraceptive ban
at issue. While Griswold relied on penumbras emanating from spe-
cific guarantees in the Bill of Rights for its authority,"' Harlan's Poe
dissent rested on an expansive construction of the word "liberty" in
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause:
105. 163 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
106. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
107. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan wrote the Plessy
dissent in 1896, but his canonization did not occur until the mid-1960s.
108. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
109. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
110. See id. at 484 (holding that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights have penum-
bras that encompass peripheral rights including a right of marital privacy).
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[Through] the course of this Court's decisions, [due process] has
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of
respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society .... [The] full scope
of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be
found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees
elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not a se-
ries of isolated points pricked out in terms of. . .[such specific
guarantees as speech and religion]. It is a rational continuum
which . . .recognizes [that] certain interests require particularly
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridge-
ment.'
Harlan found the distinction significant enough to write sepa-
rately in Griswold (mostly repeating what he had written in Poe),
and to this day the Court cites separately to the Poe dissent for its
"due process liberty" concept."2 Many of the cases that reference the
Poe dissent involve claims to extend constitutional (Fourteenth
Amendment) protection to new spheres. In Youngberg v. Romeo (in-
volving an alleged constitutional right to safe conditions of confine-
ment), for instance, the Court noted that: "In determining whether
a substantive right protected by the Due Process Clause has been
violated, it is necessary to balance 'the liberty of the individual' and
'the demands of an organized society."' 3 Thus, as with the free
speech and Olmstead dissents, the dissent in Poe derives its canoni-
cal status not so much from the subsequent repudiation of the ma-
jority holding in the case, but from its own broad construction of
Fourteenth Amendment liberty.
6. Korematsu v. United States
The lionization of the Korematsul" dissents marked a unique
development in the canonization phenomenon on multiple fronts.
First, the Korematsu decision, unlike other decisions whose dissents
eventually have become canonized, never explicitly or constructively
has been overruled. Second, although Justice Murphy's dissent is
considered the strongest in Korematsu,"' Justice Jackson's also is
111. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542-43 (citations omitted).
112. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 706 (1997); Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 287 (1994); Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 858; University of
Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982);
Roe, 410 U.S. at 168 n.3.
113. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542).
114. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
115. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 639 (12th ed. 1991).
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well-known and often cited;1.6 thus it seems appropriate to consider
both Korematsu dissents together, as a canonical unit. Indeed, while
the two dissents focus on different themes, there is a measure of
similarity in their exhortations. Both dissents protested against the
notion that the Constitution can sanction racial discrimination.
Justice Murphy, for instance, argued that the Japanese exclusion
order at issue was unconstitutional because it was motivated by an
undercurrent of racial animosity: "[Such] exclusion of 'all persons of
Japanese ancestry. . .' from the Pacific Coast ... goes over 'the very
brink of constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of ra-
cism.""' 7 Similarly, Justice Jackson warned that the Constitution
should not be stretched to accommodate racial discrimination:
[A] judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain
this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulga-
tion of the order itself.... [O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes...
the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an
order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial
discrimination .... The principle then lies about like a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward
a plausible claim of an urgent need.""
Both dissents have been canonized because they demonize the
Korematsu holding. For despite the fact that the Korematsu decision
never has been overruled, it has been disparaged by the Court at
least since the 1970s."9 Indeed, in 1988, Congress formally repudi-
ated the decision with the passage of the Restitution for World War
116. Specifically, Justice Murphy's dissent is cited seven times. See Adarand
Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 214-15 (1995); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 603-04 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 500;
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 526; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 422-23
(1948); Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 307 (1944). On the other hand, Justice
Jackson's dissent is cited four times. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 215; Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 814-15 (1994); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342, 357-58 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503, 522 (1986).
117. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 245-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
119. The Court first suggested that Korematsu had been an undesirable decision
in 1953. See Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 222 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (remarking that due process could at times leave a "dangerous latitude
for executive judgment"). By the 1970s, the Court acknowledged more definitely that
Korematsu had been discredited. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 339 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting disparagingly that "[t]his Court has not sustained a
racial classification since the wartime cases of Korematsu v. United States and Hira-
bayshi v. United States") (citations omitted); see also University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 297 (1978) (invalidating a quota for minorities at a state medi-
cal school).
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II Internment of Japanese Americans and Aleuts Act, which explic-
itly states that "Congress recognizes ... a grave injustice was done
to both citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry
by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during
World War II," and provides for the payment of reparations to
Japanese-Americans who were detained during that period.'
Interestingly, the first references to the dissents in Korematsu
were made by Justice Murphy himself, in a series of contemporary
cases dealing with the curtailment of the rights of Japanese-
Americans."' The next citation to the dissents, however, did not
occur until 1980, well after the holding in Korematsu had been dis-
credited. 22 Since then, the Court often has quoted the Korematsu
dissents as a warning of the dangers attendant to the employment
of racial preferences,12 or as an admonition against the blind accep-
tance of the "exigent circumstances" rationale for restricting consti-
tutional rights.' Thus, as with the Lochner and Plessy dissents, the
chief referential function of the Korematsu dissent has been to warn
against the repetition of past mistakes or their analogues. More-
over, the lionization of the Korematsu dissents, like that of the
Lochner and Plessy dissents, appears to have evolved primarily as a
postscript to the categorical rejection of the majority opinion in the
case.
120. Pub. L. 100-383, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 903.
121. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 671 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring)
(discussing the merits of the Alien Land Law); Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 412 (involving
a mandamus proceeding to compel the issuance of a fishing license to a person of
Japanese ancestry); Endo, 323 U.S. at 283 (ruling on a habeas corpus petition for
discharge from custody in a relocation center persons of Japanese ancestry).
122. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 525 n.5 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice
Murphy's admonition that "'[r]acial discrimination in any form and in any degree
has no justifiable part whatever in our democratic way of life'" to support his posi-
tion that the use of racial preferences for minority contractors was an impermissible
practice).
123. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 214-15 (referencing the Korematsu dissents in
connection with a challenge to a federal program preferencing disadvantaged busi-
ness enterprises); Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 603-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Justice Murphy's Korematsu dissent in arguing that the use of racial preferences
in the licensing of radio and television stations is unconstitutional); Croson, 488 U.S.
at 501 (citing Murphy's dissent as a justification in invalidating a city-sanctioned
preference for minority subcontractors).
124. See, e.g., Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 357-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citing the Korematsu dissents in arguing that mere assertions of exigency by prison
officials cannot justify the invasion of inmates' First Amendment rights); Goldman,
475 U.S. at 522 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson's dissent for the proposition
that where the Air Force has failed to furnish a credible rationale for preventing
Orthodox Jews from wearing their yarmulkes while in uniform, the Court cannot
"'distort the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem expedient'").
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D. Dissents That Were Not
The astute reader might notice that the preceding taxonomy
leaves out at least a few noteworthy post-New Deal dissents. Such a
reader also might wonder whether this omission is a limitation of
the technical ten-citation minimum I have imposed,'25 or conversely,
where there is some reason that these neglected dissents deserve to
be left out of the dissenting canon. The following subsections seek to
address this lacuna with respect to three dissents one might expect
to see in the dissenting canon.
1. Adamson v. California
In Adamson v. California, the Supreme Court held that the fed-
eral Constitution does not require states to abide by the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 126 Justice Hugo
Black dissented, arguing that the Bill of Rights applies to the
States via the Fourteenth Amendment.'27 The Court eventually
overruled Adamson's specific holding, ruling in Griffin v. California
that "the Fifth Amendment ,in its bearing on the States by reason
of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the
prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court
that such silence is evidence of guilt."'28 Moreover, during the 1960s,
the Court "selectively incorporated" many of the Bill of Rights' other
guarantees against the states.2 9 Yet the Adamson dissent does not
meet this paper's frequency of citation criteria for canonization. 130
125. See supra note 11.
126. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947).
127. See id. at 68-75 (Black, J., dissenting).
128. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
129. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (applying the Fifth Amend-
ment's privilege against self-incrimination to the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963) (finding the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (applying the Fourth Amendment against the states
by way of the Fourteenth Amendment).
130. See supra note 11. Technically, the dissent has been cited in 20 subsequent
Supreme Court cases. Search of WESTLAW, SCT database (Aug. 15, 1999) (search-
ing for "Adamson & Black /s dissenting" and retrieving 20 cases that specifically
reference the dissent rather than the majority opinion). However, only three of these
references cite the dissent as legal authority. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 559 n.16 (War-
ren, J., concurring) (citing the Adamson dissent as authority for incorporating the
Sixth Amendment against the states); Bell, 378 U.S. at 294 & n.8 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (citing the dissent's discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment's relation
to the Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Bill); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 280 (1948)
(Rutledge, J., concurring) (lamenting the Court's "depart[ure] from our constitu-
tional plan" in refusing the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of the Bill of
Rights). Of the remaining 17 citations, 15 consist of self-references by Justice Black
in later dissents or concurrences which reiterate his Adamson position. See Groppi v.
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I submit that this apparent incongruence makes perfect sense
because although the Adamson dissent technically was redeemed in
Griffin, its central position never has become the law of the land.
Indeed, the Supreme Court to this day never has fully adopted Jus-
tice Black's incorporation theory. Yet while the Adamson dissent
has failed to achieve canonical status, it has achieved something
greater than the status of an ordinary dissent. This too makes
sense, since the dissent has played an important role in the legal
debate over incorporation-prompting, for instance, Charles Fair-
man's famous law review article, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?3 '
2. Black and White Taxicab & Minersville v. Gobitis
In Black and White Taxicab v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab,"2 the
Supreme Court ruled that a state common law policy against mo-
nopoly could be ignored, and upheld a monopolistic arrangement
between two companies incorporated in different states. Justice
Holmes dissented, arguing that there is no "transcendental body of
law outside of any particular State,"13' that the common law of a
state is as much a creation of the state's sovereign power as the
statutory law, and that federal courts under the Rules of Decision
Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 515 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 377 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 275 (1970)
(Black, J., dissenting); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 344
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Black,
J., dissenting); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 676 & n.5
(1966) (Black, J., dissenting); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 407 (1964) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 91
(1964) (Black, J., concurring); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 153 (1961) (Douglas,
J., with whom Black, J., joins, dissenting); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 625
(1960); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 493 (1960) (Douglas, J., with whom Black,
J., joins, dissenting); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 656 n.12 (1948) (Rutledge J.,
with whom Black, J., joins, dissenting). The other citations merely note that the
Court has rejected the Adamson dissent's total incorporation position, or seek to
describe Justice Black's viewpoint in detail. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 287 (noting
that the Court has rejected the total incorporation view); Planned Parenthood, 505
U.S. at 847 (reaffirming the Court's rejection of the total incorporation view). I be-
lieve that it would be inappropriate to count repeated self-references or citations
that disagree with rather than exalt a dissent as steps in the process of canoniza-
tion; thus, I have considered only the four "legal authority" citations in assessing
whether the Adamson dissent meets the quantity of citation criteria outlined in
footnote 11.
131. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 173 (1949) (disagreeing with Justice Black by arguing
that the Framers failed to include the Bill of Rights into the Constitution and that
judges should accordingly respect the limits on their constitutional powers).
132. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
133. Id. at 533 (Holmes, J-, dissenting).
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Act should therefore be bound to follow state common law. Ten
years later, in the legendary case of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,"
the Court switched gears and adopted the reasoning advanced by
Justice Holmes.'35 Specifically, the Court held that the Rules of De-
cision Act applied to the common law as well as to constitutional
and statutory provisions, and that there is no such thing as federal
common law.'36 Yet by the frequency of citation criteria outlined in
footnote eleven, the Taxicab dissent does not rank among the Su-
preme Court's canonical dissents."'
Similarly, in Minersville v. Gobitis, the Court upheld a public
school board's authority to require a flag salute as a condition of
receiving a public school education against a freedom of religion
challenge."' Justice Stone dissented from the majority, noting that:
If [constitutional guarantees of civil liberty] are to have any mean-
ing they must, I think, be deemed to withhold from the state any
authority to compel belief or the expression of it where that ex-
pression violates religious convictions, whatever may be the legis-
lative view of the desirability of such compulsion."
9
Just one year later, in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, the Court overruled Gobitis, holding that it was unconsti-
tutional for public school officials to force school children to salute
the flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance.' ° Indeed, in one of its
most famous lines, the Court echoed Justice Stone's earlier senti-
ments and declared that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitu-
tional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein." 4' Yet, as with Justice Holmes's dissent in Taxicab,
Stone's Gobitis dissent has failed to achieve canonical status.4 In
fact, I discuss the two dissents together because they share the
common fate of having lost out to the majority opinions that over-
ruled them-i.e. it is the majority opinions in Erie and West Vir-
134. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
135. See id. at 78.
136. See id.
137. See supra note 11.
138. See 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940).
139. Id. at 604 (Stone, J., dissenting).
140. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1942).
141. Id.
142. Search of WESTLAW, SCT database (Aug. 15, 1999) (searching for Gobitis /s
Stone /s Dissent!" and retrieving three cases that cite or quote Justice Stone's Go-
bitis dissent).
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ginia, rather than the Taxicab and Gobitis dissents, that have be-
come part of the American constitutional canon.
I suggest that this is because the vindication of these dissents
did not follow the patterns set by either the Lochner or the free
speech type canonizations. In other words, the redemption of the
Taxicab and Gobitis dissents neither ensued from a popular repu-
diation of the majority opinions in those cases, nor served as a
springboard for the judicial expansion of individual rights. Because
the public never rose up against the Taxicab and Gobitis decisions,
there was no pre-reversal worship of the dissents in those cases.
Moreover, the reversals in Erie and West Virginia came relatively
quickly and directly; thus, there was no pre-reversal judicial eleva-
tion of the dissents, as there had been with the free speech and
Olmstead dissents, nor was there any distinction in rationales as in
the case of the Griswold decision and the second Justice Harlan's
Poe dissent. Accordingly, in the years since it overruled Taxicab and
Gobitis, the Court had no reason to privilege or exalt the dissents in
those cases over the majority opinions in Erie and West Virginia.
II. CURRENT THEORIES OF CANONICAL DISSENT
The canonization of judicial dissents and dissenters raises
numerous intriguing questions, such as why courts even bother
citing to dissents rather than to the majority opinions in the cases
that vindicate them, or why some dissents become canonized only
after they have been redeemed, while others are cited much sooner.
Yet surprisingly little attempt has been made to apprehend or
explicate the underpinnings of the canonization phenomenon. This
Part analyzes the few existing theories on the redemption of
dissents, explaining why none of them adequately accounts for the
evolution of the dissenting canon.
A. Five to Four Decisions
Justice Antonin Scalia has offered a formal theory of redeemed
dissent which essentially holds that the dissents most likely to be
vindicated by later courts are those issued in cases where the Su-
preme Court is divided by a margin of five to four." This theory,
however, does little more than state the obvious; elementary math
illustrates that five-four decisions are the most likely to be over-
turned because they require only one changed vote. More impor-
tantly, Scalia's theory fails to distinguish between the impetus for
the vindication of a dissent, versus its canonization. Indeed, if we
were to take his theory to its logical conclusion, it would suggest
143. See Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SuP. CT. HIST. 33, 39
(1994).
2000]
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
that dissents issued in five-four cases are the most likely candidates
for canonization.'" But history illustrates the fallacy of this hy-
pothesis; of the seven canonical dissents discussed above, only three
were issued in cases where the Court divided five to four.'45 In fact,
Harlan's archetypal dissent in Plessy was issued in isolation, and
the free speech cases that spawned the celebrated Holmes-Brandeis
dissents were decided seven to two.1' Moreover, numerous dissents
tendered in five-four decisions, such as Pollock v. Farmer's Loan
Trust Co., subsequently have been vindicated, but never canon-
ized. ' 7 Justice Scalia's theory, then, is both over- and under-
inclusive in its capacity to identify canonical dissents.
B. Evolving Standards of Decency
In an article entitled In Defense of Dissents, Justice William Jo-
seph Brennan suggests that the most enduring dissents are those
which "reveal the perceived congruence between the Constitution
and the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."'" If we take his term "enduring" to be the func-
tional equivalent of "canonical," his theory boils down to the intui-
tion that canonical dissents are those which presage the evolution
of societal and political norms-i.e., those dissents which time, ex-
perience, and changing circumstances eventually redeem.
Justice Brennan's description accounts rather well for the can-
onization of the seven dissents discussed above. The Lochner and
Liebmann dissents were canonized as a result of evolving standards
of economic necessity occasioned by the Great Depression.4 9 Justice
144. See id. at 18. In fairness to Justice Scalia, I do not believe that he intended
for his theory to be carried to this extreme-i.e., I do not think he meant for it to
explain the canonization, as distinguished from the redemption, of dissent. Never-
theless, I think it is useful to evaluate his theory's capacity in this regard as part of
the endeavor to uncover a suitable explanation for the canonization of dissents.
145. These three cases were Lochner (Justices Holmes, Harlan, White, and Day
dissenting), Olmstead (Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Butler, and Stone dissenting),
and Poe (Justices Harlan, Black, Douglas, and Stewart dissenting). Conversely, the
canonical dissents in Plessy, Liebmann, Korematsu, and the free speech cases were
issued eight-one (Justice Harlan dissenting), seven-two (Justices Brandeis and
Stone dissenting), six-three (Justices Murphy, Jackson, and Roberts dissenting), and
seven-two (Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissenting), respectively.
146. See supra note 145.
147. Pollock was functionally overruled by the Sixteenth Amendment, but
Harlan's dissent has not been cited as legal authority even once by subsequent
courts. Search of WESTLAW, SCT database (Aug. 15, 1999) (searching for "Pollock Is
Harlan Is Dissent!" and retrieving one document, which does not actually reference
Harlan's dissent as legal authority). See also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
148. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 431
(1986) (internal quotations omitted).
149. While Brennan does not specifically mention Lochner or Liebmann in his list
of great dissents, he acknowledges that the list is incomplete and would not, I think,
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Harlan's Plessy dissent was canonized in response to evolving stan-
dards of racial equality.5 ' The free speech dissents were lionized
because of evolving standards of respect for politically unpopular
speech, and so on.' The problem with Brennan's formulation, how-
ever, is that it cannot explain why more redeemed dissents are not
canonized. Indeed, if congruence with the "evolving standards of
decency" is the guidepost for canonization, then Justice Stone's dis-
sent in Gobitis,"' Justice Black's dissent in Betts v. Brady5' (re-
deemed by the Court's landmark decision in Gideon v. Wain-
wright),TM and Justice Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott all should have
been canonized. Yet these dissents remain largely forgotten, while
the majority opinions (or in the case of Dred Scott, the amendments)
that vindicated them have been enshrined.
Brennan also suggests that the most enduring, or canonical, dis-
sents are those that "soar with passion and ring with rhetoric....
dissents that, at their best, straddle the worlds of literature and
law." '5 This basic perception that canonical dissents are simply bet-
ter written than non-canonical dissents is a popular one. 7 How-
have objected to the inclusion of these two celebrated dissents within his formula-
tion.
150. Cf Brennan, supra note 148, at 431-32 (arguing that the nation continues to
strive toward the standards of racial equality Justice Harlan aspired to in his Plessy
dissent).
151. Cf. id. at 432 (characterizing the free speech dissenters in the same coura-
geous light as Justice Harlan in Plessy).
152. Indeed, Brennan counts Stone's Gobitis dissent in his list of enduring dis-
sents. See id. at 432. However, it would be a mistake to consider the dissent canoni-
cal given that it is rarely cited or quoted by later Courts. Search of WESTLAW, SCT
database (Aug. 15, 1999) (searching for Gobitis /s Stone Is Dissent!" and retrieving
only three documents that reference Stone's Gobitis dissent). See also supra note
148 and accompanying text.
153. 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment makes the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states), overruled by,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
154. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963).
155. West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1942), which overruled Gobitis, is a
well-known and often-cited case. Searbh of WESTLAW, KEYCITE (Feb. 21, 2000)
(retrieving a list of 3105 documents citing Barnette). Most school children have
heard of both Gideon v. Wainwright (which overruled Betts) and the Fourteenth
Amendment (which functionally overruled Dred Scott, as discussed in Part I.B.1.) is,
of course, a well-known canonical text.
156. Brennan, supra note 148, at 431.
157. See, e.g., BARTH, supra note 102, at ix (stating that the opinions discussed in
Mr. Barth's book were "selected for their literary quality and their significance as
turning points in American jurisprudence"); BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 79 (1921) (praising Holmes as a master of aphorism in the
context of discussing the Lochner dissent); Robert A. Ferguson, Holmes and the
Judicial Figure, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 155, 177 (Robert
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ever, it too fails to explain why more dissents have not been canon-
ized. The dissents in Betts v. Brady and Gobitis-not to mention
Justice Field's dissents in Slaughter-House and Munn v. Illinois-
are all eloquent literary works, but none of them has achieved ca-
nonical status. Nor are all canonical dissents literary masterpieces;
the second Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, for example,
is not particularly mellifluous or rhetorical. 58 Thus Justice Bren-
nan's formulation, too, fails adequately to explain the canonization
of dissent.
C. Substantive Holdings
In a recent essay in the Duke Law Journal, Richard Primus ar-
gues that the most important factor in the canonization of a dissent
is whether later courts agree with its substantive holding."59 In one
sense, this theory states an obvious and seemingly indisputable
proposition: Courts canonize dissents whose holdings have been
redeemed. Yet on closer inspection, this theory, like Justice Scalia's
five-four theory, is both over- and under-inclusive. First, Primus's
theory fails to explain why courts do not canonize all dissents whose
substantive holding they ultimately come to agree with. Second, it
does not adequately explain the canonizations of the free speech or
Olmstead dissents. For while it is true that the Supreme Court
eventually embraced the substantive positions advanced in these
dissents, that is hardly the reason why it chose to canonize them. In
fact, as outlined above, the Court began citing to these dissents well
before their substantive holdings had been redeemed. 6 ' Moreover,
at least in the case of the free speech dissents, the Court sometimes
quoted the dissents' constitutional constructions even while reject-
ing the broader substantive positions for which the dissents stood. In
Scales v. United States.' (decided eight years before Brandenburg
overruled Whitney), for instance, the Court cited Brandeis's Whitney
concurrence/dissent while sanctioning a statute that criminalized
the holding of membership in any organization that advocates the
overthrow of the United States government by force or violence.
This was despite the fact that the substance of the Whitney concur-
rence/dissent actually criticized the criminalization of mere mem-
W. Gordon ed., 1992) (maintaining that the key to Holmes's great dissents is their
literary style).
158. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("While
these [Bill of Rights] Amendments reach only the Federal Government, this Court
has held in the strongest terms, and today again confirms, that the concept of 'pri-
vacy' embodied in the Fourth Amendment is part of the 'ordered liberty' assured
against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citations omitted).
159. See Primus, supra note 8, at 281.
160. See supra Parts I.C.1 & I.C.2.
161. 367 U.S. 203, 228 n.20 (1961).
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bership in an organization that advocates "unlawful acts of force
and violence" in furtherance of political change. 162 Similarly, in
American Communications Association v. Douds, the Court cited
Holmes's dissent in Abrams while upholding a statute requiring
labor organization officers to disclaim membership in the Commu-
nist Party.63 In so doing, the Court was in direct contradistinction
to the Abrams dissent's substantive holding criticizing the crimi-
nalization of mere pro-Russian sentiment or advocacy, absent any
threat of "clear and present danger" to the government.'"
As a general matter, moreover, the Court's references to the free
speech and Olmstead dissents consistently have focused on the
First and Fourth Amendment constructions articulated therein-
e.g., "the marketplace of ideas"'5 and "the right to be let alone"' --
rather than on the dissents' substantive holdings. In Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, for instance, the Court quoted the
Olmstead dissent's "right to be let alone" formulation in evaluating
the constitutionality of a subpoena compelling document produc-
tion"-a scenario rather divorced from the unauthorized wiretap-
ping at issue in Olmstead. And in Garner v. Louisiana, the Court
used the "free trade in ideas" concept to extend First Amendment
protection to the act of sitting-in at a lunch counter6-a far cry
from the Espionage Act and Criminal Syndicalism convictions de-
nounced in the free speech dissents. Thus, both the timing and the
nature of judicial citation to the civil liberties dissents belie the ac-
curacy of the substantive-holding theory.
D. Modernist Epistemology
Finally, a symposium piece by Professor G. Edward White in the
New York University Law Review offers a sophisticated explanation
for the canonizations of Justices Holmes and Brandeis. 169 Specifi-
cally, Professor White argues that the commentators of the 1920s
and 1930s lionized Holmes and Brandeis not because the positions
they took in their dissenting opinions were subsequently vindicated,
162. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 360 (1927), overruled in part by, Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
163. See 339 U.S. 382, 396 n.l (1950).
164. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing)
165. See, e.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1964) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring).
166. See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204 (1946)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing)).
167. See id. at 203 n.30.
168. See Garner, 368 U.S. at 200-02 (Harlan, J., concurring).
169. See White, supra note 8.
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but because their conceptions of the role of judges and of the judicial
power itself fit with the commentators' own progressive agenda.17 °
According to Professor White's theory, the key to the canonizations
of Holmes and Brandeis was that they advanced "modernist episte-
mologies," rejecting the concept of law as a transcendent body of
unchanging principles and affirming that human beings, as the
principal architects of the universe, had the "freedom and power to
change the meaning of legal principles if they so chose."'7' Progres-
sive commentators, Professor White maintains, embraced this
jurisprudential philosophy-and aggrandized its founders-because
it resonated with their own perceptions about the role and function
of law.'72
While there is some measure of descriptive truth to Professor
White's theory, its conception ultimately is too narrow to explain
the canonizations of Justices Holmes and Brandeis. Notably, Pro-
fessor White seriously discounts the role of dissenting opinions in
the canonization process. 7' More specifically, he disregards the fact
that the dissents of Holmes and Brandeis in Lochner, Liebmann,
and other cases were far more important to commentators than
were the Justices' reasons for dissenting. Commentators latched
onto Holmes's and Brandeis's jurisprudential philosophies precisely
because those philosophies had produced the "correct" results in
Lochner and Liebmann, and thus had symbolic power. That the
commentators valued the symbolic, rather than the philosophical,
power of Holmes's and Brandeis's dissents is evidenced by their
willingness to misread7 " and even to conflate Holmes's and
Brandeis's methodologies175 as suited their needs; had they truly
170. See id. at 578-85.
171. Id. at 581.
172. See id. at 590.
173. See id. at 585.
174. Notably, the progressive commentators recast Holmes as a civil libertarian,
and Brandeis as a supporter of the New Deal. While Professor White recognizes this,
he seems to think this was a mistake, rather than an intentional tactic, on the com-
mentators' parts, motivated by their epistemologically based affinity for the Justices.
See id. at 578-79.
175. Despite their tendency to arrive at similar results, Holmes and Brandeis
often espoused substantially different rationales for their decisions. Holmes, for
instance, believed that judicial review of constitutional questions did not entitle
judges to second-guess the worth of legislation duly passed by the people's represen-
tatives. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) ("I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with
the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law."). Brandeis, by contrast,
believed that judges should consider the social and economic conditions a piece of
legislation was designed to remedy when assessing the legislation's validity. See,
e.g., PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 114-15 (1984)
(excerpting and discussing the now-legendary "Brandeis Brief' submitted in Muller
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agreed with the modernist epistemologies of Holmes and Brandeis
and viewed the Justices as prophets wiser than themselves, they
would have been far more reluctant to bend the principles articu-
lated by the Justices.
Professor White also fails to credit the role that the eventual
vindication of Holmes's and Brandeis's dissents played in cementing
their canonizations. For while savvy political commentators initi-
ated the canonizations of Holmes and Brandeis, the status of the
Justices would not have endured if the New Deal Court had not
redeemed, and ultimately canonized, their dissenting opinions in
Lochner and Liebmann. In fact, had the country not repudiated the
principles for which Lochner and Liebmann stood, Holmes's and
Brandeis's canonizations would have failed much as Felix Frank-
furter's did several years later.' 6 Moreover, had Congress or the
President, rather than the Court, discredited Lochner and Lieb-
mann, Holmes and Brandeis likely would have faded from the na-
tion's constitutional memory, as have Justices Curtis and Field.
Finally, Professor White's theory is conspicuous in its omission
of the first Justice Harlan from its cast of canonical jurists. White
suggests that Harlan's canonization differs substantially from
Holmes's and Brandeis's because it was motivated purely by the
redemption of Harlan's dissents in a series of cases involving the
rights of Negro citizens, while Holmes's and Brandeis's were based
on their modernist epistemologies. '7 However, given that dissenting
opinions were at least as important to Holmes's and Brandeis's can-
onizations as were their modernist epistemologies, Professor
White's distinction must collapse. Whatever their epistemologies,
Harlan, Holmes, and Brandeis all are canonical dissenters in the
same mold. All three, for instance, are remembered as "great dis-
senters" who "saw the light" before the rest of their contemporar-
ies.' 8 All three owe their canonizations to the fact that they' dis-
sented from decisions the nation later grew to find abhorrent. And
all three have had their views "reimagined" to suit the needs of
those responsible for their canonizations; indeed, civil rights era
commentators' willingness to reimagine Harlan into a racial egali-
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), in which Brandeis defended the constitutionality of
an Oregon statute restricting the number of hours women could work by presenting
social science research on the detrimental impact of long work hours on the health of
women).
176. See White, supra note 8, at 576 n.4 (comparing LIVA BAKER, FELIX
FRANKFURTER (1969) (presenting "official" view of Frankfurter as a competent, prin-
cipled judge), with ROBERT A. BURT, TWO JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE
PROMISED LAND 48-55, 60-61 (1988) (depicting Frankfurter as incompetent and
neurotic), and H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 5-6 (1981) (same)).
177. See White, supra note 8, at 663-65.
178. See infra note 206.
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tarian despite glaring evidence of his Chinese racism closely paral-
lels their recasting of Holmes as a civil libertarian and Brandeis as
a New Deal supporter.179
III. THE EVOLVING CANON: FROM JUDICIAL ENTRENCHMENT TO
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
As the above discussions demonstrate, any serious canonization
theory must account for two conspicuous features of the dissenting
canon: 1) the canon's distinctly New Deal origins (no dissents were
canonized prior to the New Deal); and 2) the dichotomy between the
canonizations of the civil liberty versus other dissents. This Part
endeavors to provide such a theory, suggesting that the canoniza-
tion of dissent began as a corollary of the judiciary's expansive role
in New Deal politics, and since has evolved into a judicial device for
expanding the Court's construction of constitutional rights.
As shown in Part III.A. below, the New Deal Court set a prece-
dent for acknowledging prior judicial error, and the canonization of
dissent began as a warning against the repetition of such error.
Once the precedent had been set, individual justices started citing
dissents, particularly those written by canonical dissenters, as a
device to help change the course of constitutional interpretation.
Part III.B. confronts the canonization of dissenters, explaining why
not all justices who author canonical dissents become canonized
themselves.
A. A New Deal Phenomenon
Prior to the New Deal, outright reversals of a Supreme Court
decision were extremely rare. In fact, as the controversy over the
Legal Tender Cases illustrates,8 ' the Court was exceedingly con-
cerned with the effect such reversals would have on its legitimacy
as aii institution and thus bent over backwards to reconcile or some-
how justify changes in its constitutional interpretations. With the
New Deal's switch in time, however, the Court was forced to make
several outright reversals of its prior decisions. The Court dealt
with this embarrassing situation by casting its earlier juris-
prudence as egregious judicial error and demonizing holdings such
179. See infra Part III.B.
180. See supra Part I.A.; see also WARREN, supra note 21, at 524-25 (arguing "that
the reopening of the Legal Tender Cases would be a terrible blow at the independ-
ence and dignity of the profession" and that 'It]he present action of the Court is to be
deplored, first because this sudden reversal of a former judgment which had been
maturely considered after full argument, will weaken popular respect for all deci-
sions of the Court including this last one").
[Vol.52:781
EVOLUTION OF THE CANONICAL DISSENT
as Lochner and Adkins..' that epitomized its doctrinal "mistake." In
this vein, the Court also elevated the Lochner and Liebmann dis-
sents, citing to them as an admonition against repeating the Old
Court's jurisprudential errors. Accordingly, I submit that the can-
onization of dissent began as a New Deal phenomenon made possi-
ble by the Court's repudiation of its prior jurisprudence in that in-
stance. Further, by vindicating their dissenting positions, the New
Deal cemented the canonizations of Justices Holmes and Brandeis
begun by progressive intellectuals in the 1920s and 1930s.
18
'
Once the New Deal thus had rendered it acceptable to cite dis-
senting opinions, the Court began doing so not merely as a warning
against the repetition of past mistakes, but to expand its construc-
tion of constitutional protections. Thus, during the late 1940s and
1950s, dissenting and concurring justices began referencing the free
speech and Olmstead dissents to support a broad reading of First
and Fourth Amendment rights in contexts other than political sub-
version and wiretapping.83 During the 1960s and 1970s, the Court
latched on to this trend with full force, as Justices began employing
the First and Fourth Amendment constructions of the Abrams-
Whitney-Gitlow and Olmstead dissents as a springboard for the
elaboration of new constitutional rights. Notably, the "free trade in
ideas" and "public discussion" concepts of the Abrams and Whitney
dissents were co-opted to advocate the protection of public acts of
civil disobedience,4 the possession and promulgation of obscene
materials,' 5 and the use of profanity in public speeches. 86 Similarly,
181. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937), overruling
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); see also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (noting that "[i]n the face of our abandonment of the use of the
,vague contours' of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority of the
Court believed to be economically unwise, reliance on Adams v. Tanner is as mis-
taken as would be adherence to Adkins v. Children's Hospital") (citations omitted).
182. See supra Part I.B.3.
183. See Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 102 & n.8 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
(citing Whitney concurrence/dissent in disagreeing with the conviction of persons
who advocated and practiced polygamous marriage); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 159 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead's "right to be let
alone" concept in protesting against the warrantless search of a house in connection
with the warranted arrest of its owner).
184. See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
185. See Young v. American Mini Theatre, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (supporting regulation of adult mini theater so long as it does not inter-
fere with the theater's "full opportunity for expression"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding that the "mere categorization of... films as 'obscene'
is insufficient justification for ... a drastic invasion of personal liberties guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments").
186. See Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 908 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(citing Whitney concurrence/dissent in protesting defendant's conviction for swearing
while giving a speech before a public school board, parents, and children).
2000]
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
the Olmstead dissent's "right to be let alone" principle was ex-
panded to support constitutional rights to marital privacy 8 7 and
personal autonomy;... and its caution against the dangers of over-
zealous law enforcement was quoted to support the invalidation of
mandatory drug testing 89 and fee caps for attorney representation
of veterans."
Such extensions of constitutional constructions voiced in dis-
senting opinions did not require the demonization of the cases'
original holdings for two reasons: 1) as extensions rather than abso-
lute applications of the dissenting reasoning, they did not directly
challenge the majority holdings; and 2) they gained a certain auto-
matic authority from their authors' New Deal-based canonical
status. Accordingly, the canonizations of these dissents were able to
begin, although perhaps not to flourish, before the original holdings
against which they protested had been overruled. In fact, these
early efforts to adopt the dissents' constructions facilitated the
eventual overturning of the Olmstead and Whitney holdings by ena-
bling the Court to claim that these decisions already had been
eroded by the time Katz and Brandenburg came before it.
At first blush, it might seem inconsistent for the Court to use a
process rooted in the New Deal crusade to curtail judicial activism
on behalf of economic rights as a tool to expand judicial protection
of individual rights. This constitutional development begins to make
considerable sense, however, once one recognizes the central role
played by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in both sets of canoniza-
tions. Specifically, the fact that the two dissenting justices simulta-
neously had decried legislative intervention in the economic mar-
ketplace while supporting such intervention on behalf of First and
Fourth Amendment rights lent significant legitimacy and authority
to judicial activists whose later efforts to expand constitutional pro-
tections for substantive civil liberties would be met with the charge
that they were reviving that most hated of legal precedents-
Lochnerism.19'
187. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
188. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Justice Brandeis's dissent
in Olmstead, among other authorities, in reaching its holding that the abortion ded-
sion is a constitutionally protected right).
189. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321-23 (1977) (declaring unconsti-
tutional a Georgia state law requiring that candidates for state office take a drug
test).
190. See Walter v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 367 n.14
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
191. 1 am indebted to Professor Bruce Ackerman for the elucidation of this point.
[Vol.52:781
EVOLUTION OF THE CANONICAL DISSENT
This relation between Holmes's and Brandeis's New Deal and
civil liberty dissents helps make sense of at least one other puzzling
aspect of the dissenting canon-the Court's decision to latch on to
the Holmes-Brandeis free speech model, despite the fact that
Holmes and Brandeis themselves often used the model to support
significant speech restrictions. Indeed, history seems to forget that
Holmes and Brandeis sided with the majority in Schenck v. United
States,' Frohwerk v. United States,9' and Debs v. United States,'
which upheld the criminalization of (a) peaceful advocacy against
draft resistance; (b) the publication of editorials criticizing the
draft; and (c) the delivery of public speeches opposing the First
World War, respectively. Once one appreciates the Court's obsession
with distinguishing its civil liberty jurisprudence from its Lochner-
era economic rights philosophy, however, this intentional legal am-
nesia becomes understandable.
By the 1960s, then, a dual form had evolved for the canonization
of dissents: On the one hand, dissents could be memorialized as a
judicial entrenchment of the repudiation of a hated precedent; on
the other, canonization could occur as a vehicle for the judicial ex-
pansion of constitutional rights. The key word in both of these op-
tions is 'judicial"-for canonization is a retrospective phenomenon
constructed by Supreme Court Justices who look back on and rein-
terpret the holding of a particular dissent.'95 Thus, in the aftermath
of Brown's and the civil rights movement's repudiation of the sepa-
rate but equal doctrine, the Court chose to follow the Lochner and
Liebmann model and canonize the Plessy dissent's "our Constitution
is color-blind" as a warning against the repetition of past mistakes
regarding racial segregation. Yet almost contemporaneously, it
chose to apotheosize the Fourteenth Amendment liberty construc-
tion of Harlan's Poe v. Ullman dissent as a tool to promote constitu-
tional rights including personal choice in family matters'9 the re-
192. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
193. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
194. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
195. See Primus, supra note 8, at 283. The phenomenon of retrospectively con-
structed precedent generally (i.e., without specific reference to dissents) has been
contemplated by many legal theorists. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 134
(2d ed. 1994) (noting that it is only when an earlier case is applied to later cases that
the bearing of the. earlier case becomes clear); Jan G. Deutsch, Precedent and Adju-
dication, 83 YALE L.J. 1553, 1567-71 (1974) (suggesting a thought experiment in
which Felix Frankfurter returns from the dead to counsel the Supreme Court that
its decision in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963),
will one day be reinterpreted and given a meaning they do not intend for it to have).
196. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Fiallo v.
Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 810 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Roe, 410 U.S. at 168 (Stew-
art, J., concurring).
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fusal of unwanted medical treatment,"' and safe conditions of men-
tal health confinement.
198
Further, in the case of the Korematsu dissents, the Court chose
to combine these two modes of canonization. Because the Court
never formally overruled the holding in Korematsu, and because
there never was a specific popular repudiation of the Korematsu
doctrine (i.e., military necessity as a justification for race-based
curtailment of civil rights), the Court never formally overruled the
case. Yet at the same time, the civil rights movement's agitation on
behalf of racial equality indirectly left the Korematsu holding in a
state of disrepute. By the 1980s, this disrepute was cemented, as
evinced by Congress's enactment of the Restitution for World War II
Internment of Japanese Americans and Aleuts Act.199 Accordingly,
the Court began citing to the Korematsu dissents, as it had to the
Lochner, Liebmann, and Plessy dissents, as a caution against re-
peating the errors of a hated precedent."0 However, in the vein of
the free speech, Olmstead, and Poe dissents, it also referenced the
"loaded weapon" argument of Justice Jackson's dissent to support a
greater constitutional protection of prison inmates' rights,0 ' mili-
tary servicemen's religious freedom,' and greater care in granting
trial court injunctions. 3
The varying modes of canonization employed by the Court can
best be conceptualized with reference to the following diagram:
197. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,340 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
198. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982).
199. See supra Part I.C.6.
200. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 357-58 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Brennan's Estate of Shabazz dissent quoted Justice Jackson's dissent
in Korematsu v. United States: "The principle .. .lies about like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forth a plausible claim of an ur-
gent need." 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 526 n.5 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice
Murphy's Korematsu dissent for the proposition that "r]acial discrimination in any
form and in any degree has no justifiable part whatever in our democratic way of life
.... It is unattractive in any setting but it is utterly revolting among a free people
who have embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United
States.").
201. See Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Justice Jackson's 'loaded weapon" logic in maintaining that Courts should be "espe-
cially wary of expansive delegations of power to those who wield it on the margins of
society").
202. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 502, 522 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (insisting that Orthodox Jews in the military should be permitted to wear yar-
mulkes while in uniform).
203. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 814 (1994) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting the "loaded weapon" principle
in arguing that courts should be more careful in granting free speech injunctions).
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Memorialization Source
Model of Box 1 Box 2
Construction
Recent Plessy cites Abram-Whitney-Gitlow,
Olmstead, Poe,
Korematsu
Warning Box 3 Box 4
Lochner, Recent Olmstead cites
Liebmann, Plessy Korematsu
Canonization as memorialization places a negative cast on the
original decision, and elevates the associated dissent as a warning
against the repetition of past mistakes (Box 3). Alternatively, can-
onization as a source of rights-expansion involves the judicial use of
dissenting opinions as models of construction for a given constitu-
tional right or provision (Box 2). Until recently, Boxes 1 and 4 rep-
resented only theoretical possibilities; however, the judicial treat-
ment of the Plessy, Olmstead, and Korematsu dissents during the
1980s and 1990s has put the promise of these boxes into effect. For
instance, some members of the Court have begun to use the Plessy
dissent's statement that "our Constitution is color-blind" not just as
a warning but as a model or fundamental principle of constitutional
construction-i.e., as a stick by which to measure the constitution-
ality of affirmative action programs! °4 Conversely, the Court began
citing the Olmstead dissent's criticism of official violations of the
Fourth Amendment ("If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
204. See, e.g., Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (interpreting Harlan's color-blind principle to prohibit the affirmative
action program at issue); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 521
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 522 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing) (advocating use of the "color-blind" principle as the standard for assessment of
equal protection violations); see also ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND
CONSTITUTION 113, 118-19 (1992); T. Alexander Aleinkoff, A Case for Race-
Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1075 (1991) (discussing Harlan's dissent as
the root of the color-blind constitutional ideal).
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himself; it invites anarchy")... as a warning against the dangers of
overzealous law enforcement practices. Thus, it might be said that
there are now four emerging modes or patterns for the judicial can-
onization of dissenting opinions.
B. A Word About Dissenters
Interestingly, the canonization of dissenters has not followed
the same bifurcated path paved by the canonization of dissents
themselves. Indeed, all three canonical dissenters owe their status
to the popular repudiation of the doctrines against which they pro-
tested, rather than to their brilliant constructions of First, Fourth,
or Fourteenth Amendment protections. As shown in Part I.D. above,
the canonizations of Justices Holmes and Brandeis began as part of
the progressive effort to usher in the New Deal, and essentially
were complete before the first citations to the free speech and
Olmstead dissents began. Similarly, the first Justice Harlan's can-
onization was derived from the civil rights movement's campaign
against the separate but equal doctrine he had opposed in Plessy v.
Ferguson. Moreover, Justices such as Murphy, Jackson, and John
Marshall Harlan II, whose dissents were canonized as part of a ju-
dicial expansion of constitutional rights, have failed to attain ca-
206
nonical status.
205. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
206. In assessing the canonical status of judicial dissenters, I have employed a
frequency of citation criterion similar to that used to isolate canonical dissents;
specifically, I consider as canonical dissenters those Justices who are repeatedly
referred to in the legal literature (as opposed to Supreme Court opinions) as 'great
dissenters." It should be noted that the existence of a judicial biography-even one
labeling a Justice a "great dissenter"-is not, by my calculation, suffice to render its
object a canonical dissenter; for, in my view, that the proliferation of such biogra-
phies in the last 20 years renders them an unreliable proxy for canonical status.
Moreover, it should require more than one author's favorable opinion to canonize a
dissenting Justice (just as it took more than one judicial citation to canonize a dis-
senting opinion).
In this vein, Justice Holmes has been referred to as a "great dissenter" in 27
law review articles after 1982 alone. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of
Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 1522 (1997); Luke Bierman, The Dynamics of
State Constitutional Decision-Making: Judicial Behavior at the New York Court of
Appeals, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1403, 1406 (1995); Brennan, supra note 148, at 427; Ed-
ward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative Judicial
Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 583, 590 (1994); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writ-
ing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 142 (1990); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in
a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1191 (1992); Thomas C. Grey, Molecular
Motions: The Holmesian Judge in Theory and Practice, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 19,
38 (1995); Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1331, 1352 (1995); Louis Lusky, Fragmentation of the Supreme Court: An In-
quiry into Causes, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1982); Michael Mello, Adhering
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This disparity between the canonization of dissents and dis-
senters is, I believe, a function of the fact that the elevation of dis-
sents is a judicial act, while the elevation of dissenters is a creation
of the public and of political commentators. Although the Court can
canonize a given dissent as a tool to expand constitutional rights, it
cannot force the public or political commentators to hail the dis-
sent's author. Thus, while the second Justice Harlan is a respected
figure among lawyers and legal scholars-in part because of his
dissenting opinions-he is not the popular prophet that Holmes,
Brandeis, or the first Justice Harlan are.
to Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as
Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 591 (1995); Alfred S. Neely, "A Humbug
Based on Economic Ignorance and Incompetence"-Antitrust in the Eyes of Justice
Holmes, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1, 17-18 n.56; Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The
Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72
N.C. L. REV. 91 (1993); Edward J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process Resurrected
Through the Takings Clause: Nollan, Dolan, and Ehrlich, 25 ENVTL. L. 155, 157
(1995); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminancy and Incommensurability in Constitutional
Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1461 (1990); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns
the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV.
995, 1068 (1992). Justice Brandeis is so labeled in eight post -1982 articles. See, e.g.,
Ackerman, supra at 1522; Bierman, supra at 1406; Lusky, supra at 1138; Rustad &
Koenig, supra at 107 n.66; Winter, supra at 1461. The first Justice Harlan is simi-
larly exalted in 12 articles. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, The Law and Economics of
Post-Civil War Restrictions on Interstate Migration by African-Americans, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 781, 820 (1998); Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the
Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151, 155 (1996); David P. Currie, The Constitution in
the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 324, 327 n.29 (1985); Gaffney, supra at 601; Robert J. Morris, "What Though
Our Rights Have Been Assailed?" Mormons, Politics, Same-Sex Marriage, and Cul-
tural Abuse in the Sandwich Island (Hawaii), 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 129, 162
n.288 (1997); Johnny Parker, When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again: A Critical
Review of Contemporary Equal Protection Interpretation, 37 HOw. L.J. 393, 403 n.46
(1994); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 693
(1992); Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants
and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and Civils
Rights Laws, 3 ASIAN L.J. 55, 96 (1996), and at least one book, FRANK B. LATHAM,
THE GREAT DISSENTER: JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 1833-1911, at 160 (1970). Despite
the growing literature praising Justice William Johnson as the "first dissenter," see,
for example, Benjamin F. Wright, Foreword to DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE
WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE FIRST DISSENTER: THE CAREER AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PHILOSOPHY OF A JEFFERSONIAN JUDGE at v (1954), I do not consider him a member
of the dissenting canon for two reasons: 1) as explained above, the acclamation of a
few authors is not enough to confer canonical status on a Justice; and 2) there is an
important distinction between being the "first" versus a "great" dissenter. Cf.
STRUM, supra note 175, at 365-66 (detailing how Justice Brandeis chose the cases in
which he issued a dissenting opinion and stating "Brandeis dissented when he con-
sidered it important to do so, but only after extensive attempts to bring the Court
around to his way of thinking and only in carefully chosen cases").
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But what, if not the respect of his brethren and the canonization
of his dissents, motivates the public to canonize a dissenter? I want
to suggest a simple answer: constitutional sins. Constitutional
sins-i.e., interpretations of the Constitution that the public later
.comes to find morally repugnant-produce judicial saints, because
when the public finds that the Constitution in its current form..7
has sanctioned an outcome now considered abhorrent, the public
needs a way of absolving that sacred document of the sin. Jurists
who protested against the sin in the first place, and advanced con-
stitutional interpretations that would have kept the nation's char-
.ter clean of its imprimatur, provide such absolution. Indeed, in ret-
rospect there seems something oracular about such jurists' ability to
see the light where everyone else failed. Thus, the public embraces
these dissenters as judicial seers and pretends that theirs always
has been the correct way to interpret the Constitution.
This explains why all three of the great canonical dissenters-
Holmes, Brandeis, and Harlan-have to some degree been "reimag-
ined"05 in the course of their canonizations. Holmes, for instance,
has been characterized as a progressive liberal, despite his uneasi-
ness with "redistributive social legislation ... [and his] conservative
approach to many civil liberties issues."' °9 Similarly, Brandeis is
heralded as the "spiritual father of the New Deal" 10 although he
disagreed with many of the Roosevelt administration's New Deal
policies. "' And Harlan, an open racist in the nineteenth century,2
has come to be viewed as a racial egalitarian in the twentieth. All of
these reimaginings are part of the reconstruction of dissenters into
judicial saints. In attempting to erase the imprimatur of constitu-
tional sins from the legal landscape, the public conveniently has
ignored those aspects of prophetic dissenters' jurisprudence and
philosophies that do not fit its constitutional vision, and has con-
ferred on these dissenters a status they do not fully deserve. Even
207. I add this caveat because if the Constitution is altered to remedy the sin, as
with the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, then there is no need
to explain away or separate the hated precedent from the text.
208. For a fuller discussion of the reimagination concept, see Primus, supra note
8, at 285-300.
209. White, supra note 8, at 590; see also, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207
(1927) (upholding the constitutionality of a state law requiring the sterilization of
mentally disordered persons); cases discussed supra Part III.A. (discussing conser-
vative free speech decisions by Holmes and Brandeis).
210. White, supra note 8, at 606 (quoting Warren H. Pierce, Shaper of Economic
Thought, CHI. DAILY TIMES, Oct. 7, 1941, reprinted in MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS:
GREAT AMERICAN 58 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1941)).
211. See White, supra note 8, at 602 (noting that Brandeis disagreed with the
notion of a pervasive federal government in regulatory matters).
212. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 206, at 157 (chronicling Harlan's unmistakable
Chinese racism).
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the language used to describe these dissenters is part of the project;
for in using words rife with religious connotation-e.g., prophet,
saint, revered, sacred-we are, perhaps somewhat unconsciously,
putting distance between the constitutional interpretations ad-
vanced by Holmes, Brandeis, and Harlan-and those which they
have replaced. In this sense, it is no accident that the legal commu-
nity has chosen to label Holmes, Brandeis, and Harlan as proph-
ets-a word which, as Mr. Primus has noted, describes one who "re-
calls a people to its foundations, chastising them for having strayed
from the true path."213
CONCLUSION
In detailing the development of the dissenting canon, this Arti-
cle has sought to shift, rather than to end, the discourse on canoni-
cal dissents. Prior discussions all have assumed the existence of the
canon, but none has examined or analyzed its origins or develop-
ment. Such analysis is vital, I believe, because it reveals something
instructive about the recent development of the nation's constitu-
tional law.
First, an understanding of how the dissenting canon evolved
helps explain the proliferation of dissenting opinions on the modern
Court; ever since the New Deal made possible the canonization of
dissenting opinions, Justices who differ from the majority have had
an incentive to dissent rather than compromise, in the hope that
their vision might someday be vindicated and immortalized. Second,
the evolution of canonical dissents suggests that dissents written in
cases involving morally-charged political issues-such as Bowers v.
Hardwick... (homosexuality), Roe v. Wade215 (abortion), Furman v.
Georgia.6 (death penalty)-are the most likely candidates for future
canonization, since morally-charged cases are the most susceptible
to popular repudiation.
Finally, an understanding of how the dissenting canon evolved
helps inform our understanding of how the legal canon as a whole is
shaped. For instance, the significance of popular repudiation to the
dissenting canon brings to light the fact that memorialization of
morally-charged political milestones long has been an important
contributing factor in the canonization of texts other than dissents
(consider, for example, the Declaration of Independence, the Eman-
cipation Proclamation, and the Gettysburg Address). Similarly, the
canonizations of the civil liberties dissents as models of construction
213. Primus, supra note 8, at 278.
214. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
215. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
216. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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illustrates how other elements of the legal canon might consciously
be constructed in the manner of the civil liberties dissents (see, for
instance, Balkin's and Levinson's suggestion that Frederick Doug-
lass's speeches should be part of the constitutional canon117). Ulti-
mately, then, the story of how various dissenting opinions entered
the legal canon is more than a matter of mere curiosity; it is a story
of how judges, lawyers, the media, and popular sentiment interact
with each other in the construction of legal myth. The story of ca-
nonical dissents is thus a canon within a canon, so to speak-and as
such, worthy of considerable further study.
217. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at 966 (positing that Frederick Doug-
lass's speeches would balance Roger Taney's 1857 constitutional commentary, which
is often cited in constitutional casebooks).
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